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ABSTRACT		Dravidianism:	Theorizing	Identity,	Religion,	Culture,	and	Society	in	Modern	Tamil	Reformist	Thought		by		 Collin	Michael	Sibley		Around	the	turn	of	the	20th	Century,	a	distinctive	set	of	social	and	cultural	reformist	movements	emerged	in	the	Tamil-speaking	region	of	Madras	Presidency,	one	of	the	major	administrative	divisions	of	British	colonial	India.	These	movements,	which	were	affiliated	with	thinkers	such	as	Iyothee	Thass,	Maraimalai	Adigal,	and	"Periyar"	E.V.	Ramasamy,	articulated	their	reformist	ideologies	through	the	lens	of	a	shared	historical	narrative	that	told	the	story	of	the	"Aryan"	or	"Brahmin"	subversion	of	an	ancient	and	enlightened	"Dravidian"	or	Tamil	society	indigenous	to	the	Tamil	South.	This	thesis	argues	that	individual	discursive	terms	such	as	"caste",	"religion",	"Tamil",	and	"Brahmin"	in	the	"Dravidianist"	discourse	of	these	movements	cannot	be	understood	in	isolation	from	each	other;	rather,	they	all	participate	in	a	semantic	field	that	coheres	around	the	core	narrative	of	ancient	Dravidian	history.	This	study	connects	this	characteristic	trait	of	Dravidianist	thought	to	certain	aspects	of	the	intellectual	and	material	context	of	colonial	Madras	Presidency. iii	
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Introduction 	In	the	latter	half	of	the	19th	Century,	Tamil-speaking	intellectuals	based	in	the	Madras	Presidency	region	of	British	colonial	India	became	keenly	interested	in	the	civilizational	history	of	the	Tamil	people.	One	of	the	most	important	causes	for	this	explosion	of	interest	in	ancient	Tamil	civilization	was	the	1858	publication	of	a	colonial	philological	treatise,	A	comparative	grammar	of	the	Dravidian	or	South-
Indian	family	of	languages,	written	by	the	Protestant	Scottish	missionary	Robert	Caldwell.	Caldwell’s	primary	focus	in	this	text	is	to	argue	that	the	four	major	languages	of	South	India	-	Tamil,	Telugu,	Kannada,	and	Malayalam	–	descended	from	a	common	linguistic	ancestor	in	ancient	history.	Caldwell’s	case	for	the	existence	of	a	Dravidian	family	of	languages	has	since	become	canonical	in	modern	linguistic	science,	but	the	considerable	social	and	cultural	significance	of	Caldwell’s	work	in	the	Tamil	country	derives	primarily	from	a	subsidiary	argument	in	Caldwell’s	text.	Caldwell	uses	the	findings	from	his	comparative	philological	study	to	advance	a	broader	argument	about	the	history	of	ancient	South	Indian	civilization.	Previous	colonial	commentators	had	more	or	less	universally	dismissed	the	idea	that	civilized	society	existed	in	India	prior	to	the	introduction	of	Vedic	culture	at	the	hands	of	Aryan	pastoralists	entering	the	Subcontinent	across	its	northwest	border.	Caldwell,	combining	the	findings	of	his	philological	study	with	his	observations	of	classical	Tamil	literature,	argued	that	the	common,	non-Indo-Aryan	ancestor	of	Tamil	and	the	other	Dravidian	languages	indicated	the	existence	of	a	culturally	accomplished,	pre-Sanskritic	society	indigenous	to	the	Tamil-speaking	region	of	South	India.			
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Since	the	publication	of	Caldwell’s	work,	countless	Tamil	historians,	politicians,	literary	scholars,	social	critics,	and	religious	reformers	have	used	Caldwell’s	vision	of	an	indigenous	and	autonomous	Tamil	civilizational	past	as	the	foundation	for	a	variety	of	cultural	or	social	arguments.	Some	important	historians	and	Indian	nationalists	granted	esteem	to	the	Dravidian	Tamil	past	as	a	regional	component	of	a	single,	unified	history	of	the	Indian	nation.1	In	these	schemes,	the	Sanskritic	culture	associated	with	the	ancient	Aryans	retained	its	place	as	the	basis	for	Indian	national	unity.	However,	a	number	of	other	Tamil	thinkers	and	activists	emphasized	the	historical	distinctiveness	of	Dravidian	Tamil	culture	and	society	from	the	Sanskritic	culture	of	Aryan	North	India.	The	first	half	of	the	20th	Century	saw	the	emergence	of	a	set	of	influential	Tamil	social	and	political	movements	that	used	a	distinctive	reading	of	Caldwell’s	historical	narrative	as	the	foundation	for	a	variety	of	activist	social	projects.	This	particular	discursive	move	generated	a	prodigious	body	of	reformist	social,	religious,	and	cultural	thought	characterized	by	a	shared	set	of	ideological	and	symbolic	structures	and	associations.	This	rich	discursive	formation,	which	I	call	“Dravidianism”2,	is	the	subject	of	this	thesis.		“Dravidianist”	thought	is	best	exemplified	in	the	work	of	three	brilliant	Tamil	reformist	thinkers:	Pandit	Iyothee	Thass3	(1845-1914),	the	leader	of	an	early	20th-Century	Tamil	Buddhist	movement	that	presented	the	Dalit4	Paraiyar	caste	community	as	Ādi	Drāviḍas,	the	indigenous	“first	Dravidians”	of	ancient	Tamil	society;	Maraimalai	Adigal	(né	Swami	Vedachalam;	1876-1950),	a	prolific	Saivite5	intellectual	and	theologian	who	expounded	a	reading	of	the	Tamil	theological-ritual	
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school	of	Saiva	Siddhanta	as	the	original	religion	of	ancient	Tamil	society	and	was	a	foundational	figure	in	the	Tamil	linguistic	purity	movement;	and	“Periyar”	E.V.	Ramasamy	(1879-1973),	a	dynamic	and	iconoclastic	orator,	thinker,	and	social	organizer	who	expounded	a	radical	ideology	of	anti-casteism,	rationalist	atheism,	women’s	rights,	and	economic	leftism	over	the	course	of	a	nearly	sixty-year-long	activist	career.	A	host	of	other	significant	intellectuals,	organizers,	activists,	and	politicians,	such	as	Rettamalai	Srinivasan6,	T.M.	Nair7,	the	Raja	of	Panagal8,	Neelambikai	Ammaiyar9,	Moovalur	Ramamritham	Ammaiyar10,	Kaivalyam	Swamigal11,	C.N.	Annadurai12,	and	M.	Karunanidhi13,	made	important	ideological	and	organizational	contributions	to	the	Dravidianist	school,	either	from	within	Thass,	Adigal,	and	Periyar’s	activist	organizations,	or	as	part	of	important	electoral	political	parties	such	as	the	Justice	Party	and	the	early	Drāviḍa	Muṉṉetṟa	Kaḻagam	(“Dravidian	Progress	Association”;	abbreviated	DMK).			All	of	these	projects	operated	on	the	basic	premise	that	the	introduction	of	the	hierarchical	religious-social-cultural	system	of	Brahminical	Hinduism	by	self-interested	interlopers	from	the	Aryan	North	had	subverted	the	fundamentally	equitable	and	enlightened	indigenous	Dravidian	civilization	of	the	Tamil	South.	This	relatively	simple	premise,	filtered	through	Caldwell’s	narrative	of	Dravidian	civilizational	history,	generates	a	rich	network	of	ideological	and	symbolic	associations	that	informs	every	aspect	of	these	activist	movements’	ideologies	and	platforms.	This	network	ties	together	a	range	of	different	dimensions	of	sociocultural	identity	such	as	caste,	religion,	and	language,	so	that	each	term	always	
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implicitly	invokes	the	other	terms	of	the	network	of	the	others	and	relies	on	the	broader	Dravidianist	associative	scheme	for	its	full	meaning.		I	take	this	fundamental	feature	of	Dravidianism	to	merit	an	important	methodological	consideration.	Given	the	associative	nature	of	Dravidianist	thought,	arriving	at	an	accurate	interpretation	of	terms	like	“Brahmin”,	“Hindu”,	and	“nation”	in	Dravidianist	discourse	requires	an	understanding	of	the	broader	Dravidianist	network	of	associations	and	symbologies	in	which	these	terms	participate.	Reading	these	terms	without	an	eye	towards	the	specific	ideological	context	in	which	they	are	situated	obscures	the	internal	consistency	of	Dravidianist	logic	and	can	lead	to	major	misrepresentations	of	the	actual	functions	of	individual	discursive	terms	within	a	given	Dravidianist	argument.	No	dimension	of	Dravidianist	ideology	is	more	susceptible	to	this	sort	of	misrepresentation	than	the	discursive	category	of	Tamil	identity	itself.	As	the	symbolic	center	of	Dravidianism,	Tamil	identity	as	constructed	through	Dravidianist	discourse	is	a	repository	for	all	components	of	the	Dravidianist	activist	vision.	Stripped	of	their	connection	to	the	Dravidianist	associative	network,	Dravidianist	appeals	to	Tamil	identity	appear	to	be	examples	of	simple	ethnic	nationalism.	Indeed,	the	Dravidianist-inspired	rhetoric	associated	with	the	two	“Dravidian”	parties	that	dominate	modern	Tamil	Nadu	politics	–	that	is,	the	DMK	and	its	electoral	rival,	the	AIADMK	(All-India	Aṇṇa	Drāviḍa	Muṉṉetṟa	
Kaḻagam;	“All-India	Anna14	Dravidian	Progress	Association”)	–	fall	much	closer	to	this	type	of	cultural	nationalism,	since	the	Dravidian	parties’	invocations	of	Tamil	cultural	identity	have	little	to	no	impact	on	the	parties’	essentially	populist	political	
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platforms.	Dravidianist	aspirations	to	nationalism	or	cultural	reform,	however,	are	founded	on	the	connection	between	Tamil	cultural	identity	and	other	dimensions	of	the	idyllic	ancient	Tamil	society.	At	the	same	time,	the	importance	of	Tamil	ethnocultural	identity	in	the	Dravidianist	associative	network	cannot	be	ignored.	Both	the	Tamil	language	and	the	classics	of	Tamil	literature	are	constitutive	elements	of	the	Dravidianist	associative	network,	and	the	social	goals	of	a	given	Dravidianist	project	are	inseparable	from	the	cultural	symbolism	with	which	they	are	invested.			Several	events	associated	with	the	recent	popular	outcry	in	Tamil	Nadu	surrounding	the	bull-taming	practice	of	jallikaṭṭu	offers	a	terrific	example	of	a	number	of	features	of	Dravidianist	social	critique.	On	one	hand,	the	outcry	surrounding	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue	itself	bears	strong	marks	of	the	Dravidianist	activist	legacy.	On	the	other	hand,	the	specific	response	that	the	VCK,	a	Dravidianist	Dalit	political	party,	offered	to	the	
jallikaṭṭu	issue	provides	a	striking	example	of	Dravidianist	social	critique	at	work.	Before	we	enter	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	the	formal	structure	of	Dravidianist	thought,	we	should	first	take	a	close	look	at	this	example	as	both	a	tangible	picture	of	Dravidianist	activism	and	a	testament	to	the	importance	of	understanding	the	topography	of	Dravidianist	logic.	
Jallikaṭṭu and Tamil Identity 		
Jallikaṭṭu	is	traditionally	practiced	in	rural	Tamil	Nadu	as	part	of	the	festivities	surrounding	Pongal,	a	harvest	festival	that	is	one	of	the	most	important	holidays	on	
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the	Tamil	calendar.	Jallikaṭṭu	competitions	are	similar	to	American	rodeos:	one	by	one,	contestants	–	physically	fit	young	men	typically	hailing	from	the	intermediate-caste	Thevar	and	Kallar	communities	–	chase	down	bulls	released	from	pens	and	attempt	to	keep	hold	of	them	for	a	certain	duration.	Those	who	are	successful	are	awarded	prizes	–	traditionally,	garlands	of	silver	coins	tied	to	the	horns	of	the	tamed	bull	(hence,	the	name	jallikaṭṭu,	which	literally	means	“bull-tying”).	Bulls	are	specially	bred	and	raised	for	jallikaṭṭu	competitions	by	well-to-do	Thevar	and	Kallar	landowners,	who	derive	honor	(Tamil	māṉam)	from	offering	up	particularly	strong	and	virile	specimens.		In	2014,	the	Indian	Supreme	Court	issued	a	ruling	banning	jallikaṭṭu	on	the	grounds	that	the	practice	violated	the	Indian	constitutional	injunction	against	animal	cruelty,	a	violation	no	doubt	made	more	egregious	by	the	involvement	of	cows,	a	prominent	religious	and	cultural	symbol	in	the	Hindu	nationalist	symbology	associated	with	the	ruling	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	(BJP)	national	government.	The	Supreme	Court	upheld	its	jallikaṭṭu	ban	in	2016,	a	decision	that	set	off	public	demonstrations	across	Tamil	Nadu	–	most	notably	the	massive,	weeklong	protest	at	Chennai’s	Marina	Beach,	which	drew	Tamilians	from	a	wide	range	of	occupational	and	social	backgrounds	including	several	Tamil	celebrities.	Other	high-profile	Tamil	celebrities	publically	supported	the	jallikaṭṭu	protests,	and	the	agitations	elicited	a	statewide	outpouring	of	support	on	social	media.			
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While	the	practice	of	jallikaṭṭu	is	most	closely	associated	with	rurally	based	Tamilians	from	the	intermediate-caste	Thevar	and	Kallar	communities,	the	actual	social	and	cultural	position	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	tradition	in	Tamil	society	was	largely	immaterial	to	the	participants	and	supporters	of	the	Marina	Beach	protests.	A	large	number	of	the	protestors	at	Marina	Beach	were	urban	university	students	and	young	professionals,	many	of	whom	had	never	actually	encountered	jallikaṭṭu	in	person,	let	alone	participated	in	it.15	For	the	vast	majority	of	people	associated	with	the	jallikaṭṭu	protest	movement,	the	Indian	Supreme	Court’s	ruling	on	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue	was	symbolic	of	a	broader	relationship	between	Tamil	culture	and	the	Indian	national	government.	The	characteristic	feature	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	protest	movement	was	its	rhetorical	focus	on	the	affirmation	and	defense	of	Tamil	cultural	autonomy.	Painted	signs,	chanted	slogans,	and	protest	memes	denounced	the	jallikaṭṭu	ban	as	a	recent	example	of	a	longstanding	campaign	by	a	North	Indian-dominated	government	to	impose	its	cultural	agenda	on	the	Tamil	South.	It	was	on	these	grounds	that	the	volatility	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue	crossed	a	wide	range	of	Tamil	social	boundaries,	far	outstripping	the	sociocultural	importance	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	practice	itself	in	contemporary	Tamil	society.		Dalit	activists	in	Tamil	Nadu,	however,	could	not	so	easily	disregard	the	social	circumstances	surrounding	the	jallikaṭṭu	tradition.	While	Thevar	and	Kallar	apologists	dismissed	Dalit	grievances	with	the	practice,	a	number	of	important	Dalit	public	figures	argued	that	the	jallikaṭṭu	tradition	was	discriminatory,	demeaning,	and	economically	burdensome	to	the	Dalit	communities	in	the	village	settings	where	
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it	was	celebrated.	Dalits	were	typically	barred	from	participating	as	bull-tamers	in	
jallikaṭṭu	celebrations,	despite	in	many	cases	being	the	ones	primarily	responsible	for	raising	the	bulls	specially	set	aside	for	the	practice.	The	relegation	of	this	caretaker	role	to	the	Dalit	community	both	reaffirmed	Dalits’	traditional	role	as	menial	agricultural	laborers	in	village	caste	economy	and	limited	Dalit	opportunities	for	economic	and	social	mobility.16	Both	of	the	two	chief	Dalit	political	parties	of	Tamil	Nadu,	namely	the	VCK	(Viḍudalai	Chiṟudaigaḷ	Kaṭchi;	“Liberation	Panthers	Party”)	and	Pudiya	Tamiḻagam	(“New	Tamil	Land”),	spoke	publically	on	the	caste	dimension	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	tradition	in	their	official	responses	to	the	ban.	The	Ambedkarite-aligned	Pudiya	Tamiḻagam	came	out	in	support	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	ban,	arguing	that	the	casteist	nature	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	practice	took	precedence	over	the	regional	concern	for	the	preservation	of	Tamil	cultural	autonomy.	K.	Krishnaswamy,	the	leader	of	Pudiya	Tamiḻagam,	presented	a	series	of	arguments	discrediting	the	notion	that	jallikaṭṭu	was	a	practice	representative	of	ancient	Tamil	cultural	heritage.17	However,	the	VCK,	while	echoing	Pudiya	Tamiḻagam’s	condemnation	of	the	impact	jallikaṭṭu	had	on	village	Dalit	communities,	took	a	public	position	in	support	of	the	Marina	Beach	protests.	Instead	of	calling	for	the	ban	of	jallikaṭṭu	outright,	Tholkappiyan	Thirumavalavan18,	the	ideological	leader	and	public	face	of	the	VCK,	argued	that	Tamilians	themselves	should	reform	jallikaṭṭu	to	make	it	a	caste-free	practice.19			The	VCK	has	strong	credentials	as	an	anti-caste	activist	organization.	The	VCK	began	as	an	organization	known	as	the	Dalit	Panther	Iyakkam,	which	advocated	violence	as	
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a	means	of	defense	against	caste	atrocities	directed	against	the	Dalit	community.20	Although	the	VCK	softened	its	militancy	and	made	a	formal	entry	into	Tamil	electoral	politics	some	twenty	years	ago,	the	party	has	maintained	a	substantial	organizational	focus	on	social	activism	and	has	continued	to	expound	a	radical	Dalit	liberationist	political	ideology.	It	was	this	organizational	reputation	as	a	radical	anti-caste	activist	group	that	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK	put	on	the	line	by	endorsing	the	protests	against	the	national	jallikaṭṭu	ban.	The	VCK’s	endorsement	becomes	even	more	poignant	in	light	of	the	fact	that	the	Thevar	and	Kallar	communities	traditionally	associated	with	jallikaṭṭu	are	among	the	chief	perpetrators	of	casteist	violence	against	Dalit	populations	across	rural	Tamil	Nadu,	and	these	incidences	of	violence	are	a	consistent	focus	of	VCK	party	activism.21	Nevertheless,	while	the	stakes	of	the	VCK’s	endorsement	appear	high,	the	VCK’s	reputation	did	not	substantially	suffer	in	Tamil	Dalit	intellectual	and	activist	circles	from	the	position	it	took	on	the	protests.22	To	an	observer	unacquainted	with	the	VCK	and	the	broader	social	and	political	landscape	of	Tamil	Nadu,	both	the	VCK’s	stance	on	the	jallikaṭṭu	protests	and	the	lack	of	any	enduring	backlash	against	the	VCK	among	Tamil	Dalit	activists	might	seem	incomprehensible.	Why	did	the	VCK,	a	party	chiefly	comprised	of	and	supported	by	Dalit	Tamilians	and	associated	with	a	radical	platform	of	caste	reform,	publically	endorse	the	Marina	Beach	protests	despite	recognizing	jallikaṭṭu’s	imbrication	in	a	system	of	socioeconomic	caste	oppression?	What	stake	did	the	VCK	have	in	saving	jallikaṭṭu?		
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Since	the	VCK	is	indeed	an	electoral	political	party,	we	cannot	dismiss	the	idea	that	contingent	political	interests	played	a	role	in	the	VCK’s	deliberation	process.	The	VCK’s	shift	from	pure	social	activism	to	activist	electoral	politics	has	brought	with	it	the	attendant	electoral	considerations	of	voter	banks	and	political	constituencies.23	As	a	minority	party	in	the	coalition-driven	Tamil	political	landscape,	the	VCK’s	political	influence	is	tied	to	the	voter	base	it	can	deliver	to	broader	political	alliances,	rather	than	the	seats	–	if	any	–	that	it	wins	in	state	legislature.	As	the	size	and	regional	spread	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	protests	indicated,	action	on	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue	appeals	to	a	constituency	far	broader	than	the	VCK’s	base	with	the	Dalit	communities	of	northern	Tamil	Nadu,	and	so	the	potential	political	motivations	of	the	VCK’s	move	are	clear.	Outside	of	this	appeal	to	the	electoral	mainstream,	
jallikaṭṭu	also	perhaps	presented	the	VCK	with	a	bridge	to	the	specific,	Backwards	Caste	communities	generally	associated	with	jallikaṭṭu,	the	electorally	significant	Thevar	and	Kallar	jāti	communities.	Given	the	regular	strains	that	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK’s	agitations	against	caste	atrocities	place	on	the	party’s	relationship	with	these	communities	–	again,	since	it	is	communities	of	the	Thevar	and	Kallars’	general	social	position	that	are	the	principal	perpetrators	of	caste	violence	in	contemporary	Tamil	Nadu	–	defending	jallikaṭṭu	as	a	traditional	element	of	Tamil	culture	presents	an	opportunity	to	temper	Thevar	and	Kallar	antagonism	towards	the	VCK	and	its	political	candidates	without	softening	the	core	of	the	VCK’s	anti-caste	activism.			
		 11	
Naturally,	we	cannot	dismiss	these	political	interests	out	of	hand	as	irrelevant	to	the	VCK’s	position	on	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue.	However,	understanding	the	VCK’s	position	solely	through	the	lens	of	these	political	considerations	disregards	an	important	component	of	the	VCK’s	anti-caste	ideology	–	a	component	that	makes	the	VCK’s	position	on	jallikaṭṭu	consistent	with	its	broader	Dalit	liberationist	ideology.	I	believe	that	the	fidelity	of	the	VCK’s	position	on	jallikaṭṭu	to	the	party’s	broader	anti-caste	platform	is	an	important	reason	why	the	VCK’s	stance	on	jallikaṭṭu	did	not	suffer	wider	condemnation	from	Tamil	anti-caste	activists.	The	VCK’s	particular	brand	of	Dalit	liberationist	ideology	is	representative	of	the	Dravidianist	school	of	social	activism.	This	distinct	orientation	leads	the	VCK	to	define	and	contextualize	the	identity	of	the	Tamil	Dalit	community	and	its	social	and	political	obligations	in	a	way	that	is	not	always	commensurable	with	the	pan-Indian	Ambedkarite	approach	reflected	in	Pudiya	Tamiḻagam’s	political	platform.			Classical	Ambedkarite	thought	understands	the	institution	of	hierarchical	caste	as	a	transethnic,	pan-South	Asian	social	structure	paradigmatically	(although	not	necessarily	prohibitively)	associated	with	the	texts	and	rituals	of	Brahmanical	Hinduism.	Through	the	classical	Ambedkarite	lens,	Dalit	communities	from	across	India	share	a	common	social	and	political	identity	by	merit	of	the	oppression	and	degradation	they	experience	as	the	direct	result	of	their	attributed	identity	in	this	paradigmatically	Brahmanical	and	Hindu	transregional	system.	Hence,	the	Marathi	and	Hindi	word	“dalit”,	which	means	“scattered”	or	“fractured”,	stands	as	a	marker	for	a	“fractured”	transethnic	and	pan-Indian	peoplehood	–	one	with	its	own	
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distinctive	social	and	cultural	history24	and	common	political	future	within	the	Indian	nation.	Dr.	Ambedkar	himself	spent	his	long	and	distinguished	career	as	a	political	thinker	and	activist	working	to	set	the	legal	and	intellectual	foundation	for	India’s	Dalits	to	inhabit	this	collective	social-cultural	identity	and	consolidate	their	political	power	on	the	national	stage.	Ambedkar’s	famous	agitation	for	the	establishment	of	a	separate	Dalit	electorate	in	national	Indian	elections	reflects	his	understanding	that	Dalit	social	identity	yields	a	discrete	set	of	policy	interests	generalizable	to	the	national	political	process.	Thus,	Ambedkar	takes	Dalit	identity,	constituted	principally	as	a	Brahmanical	ritual	position	tied	to	a	distinctive,	transregional	experience	of	caste	oppression25,	to	be	able	to	bridge	the	gaps	between	other,	potentially	competing	identity	claims	that	internally	differentiate	the	Dalit	community.	The	most	apparent	of	these	competing	identity	claims	are	the	numerous	ethnic,	linguistic,	cultural,	and	regional	identities	consolidated	under	the	flag	of	the	Indian	nation.	Modern	Ambedkarite	political	ideology	operates	under	the	assumption	that	these	dimensions	of	identity	do	not	play	a	major	constitutive	role	in	the	political	and	social	policies	that	best	serve	the	national	Dalit	community.	If	anything,	mainstream	Ambedkarite	politics	understands	deference	to	regional	or	ethnic	considerations	in	matters	of	Dalit	activist	policy	to	run	counter	to	Dalit	political	interests,	since	such	deference	segments	the	political	unity	of	the	national	Dalit	community	and	alienates	pro-Dalit	activism	from	the	foundational	Ambedkarite	understanding	of	Dalit	identity	as	a	socioreligious	position	within	the	paradigmatically	Brahmanical	South	Asian	social	structure	of	hierarchical	caste.	In	the	case	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue,	this	means	that	giving	special	consideration	to	
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jallikaṭṭu’s	cultural	position	as	a	Tamil	folk	tradition	only	serves	to	hinder	the	broader	Ambedkarite	project	of	radical	social	reform,	which	stands	equally	to	benefit	Tamil	Dalit	communities	and	the	other	ethnic	Dalit	communities	scattered	across	India.		The	VCK,	like	all	modern	Dalit	activist	groups,	draws	deeply	from	Dr.	Ambedkar’s	thought	and	the	Ambedkarite	political	paradigm.	As	a	self-professed	Ambedkarite	movement	(even	if	a	heterodox	one),	the	VCK	shares	other	Dalit	activist	parties’	paramount	ideological	concern	for	securing	the	political	empowerment	and	social	dignity	of	Dalit	communities.	Obviously,	the	VCK’s	self-presentation	as	a	Dalit	and	Ambedkarite	political	party	reflects	its	endorsement	of	Ambedkar’s	foundational	assumption	that	Dalit	identity	can	serve	as	a	basis	for	mass	political	mobilization.	However,	the	VCK	diverges	from	the	classic	Ambedkarite	position	in	its	estimation	of	the	role	that	ethnocultural	identity	plays	in	the	struggle	for	Dalit	liberation.	While	the	Ambedkarite	position	seeks	to	transcend	the	ethnic,	cultural,	linguistic,	and	regional	boundaries	that	separate	India’s	Dalit	communities,	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK	instead	emphasize	the	cultural	distinctiveness	of	the	Tamil	land.	The	VCK	does	not	present	this	focus	on	Tamil	cultural	autonomy	as	a	self-standing	cultural	project	that	supplements	its	radical	Ambedkarite	social	and	political	platform.	Rather,	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK	understand	the	defense	of	native	Tamil	culture	to	be	a	component	feature	of	the	Dalit	liberation	project	itself.			
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The	Tamil	Dalit	poet-activist	Meena	Kandasamy	has	translated	and	compiled	two	brief	but	incredibly	rich	compilations	of	Thirumavalavan’s	speeches	and	writings26,	and	these	compilations	contain	a	number	of	illuminating	passages	outlining	the	VCK’s	characteristic	approach	to	Dalit	liberation	politics.	An	excerpt	in	one	of	these	volumes,	taken	from	a	speech	Thirumavalavan	delivered	at	a	VCK	party	function	in	Madurai	on	Ambedkar’s	birthday,	provides	an	explicit	and	powerful	statement	of	the	VCK’s	rejection	of	a	pan-Indianist	approach	to	Ambedkarite	politics	and	points	us	to	the	specific	conception	that	connects	the	Dalit	cause	to	Tamil	culture	in	the	VCK’s	thought:	I	am	duty	bound	to	say	this	to	those	who	do	business	on	the	name	of	Revolutionary	Ambedkar:	Dalit	politics	is	not	beyond	Tamil.	Dalit	politics	is	not	beyond	individual	linguistic	identity.	Dalit	politics	is	not	joining	hands	with	Hindutva	forces	and	making	a	scene.	Dalit	politics	lies	in	retrieving	our	identity,	the	identity	of	the	sons	of	the	soil.	It	is	only	if	you	understand	this	truth,	[that]	you	will	know	why	we	integrate	Tamil	and	liberation	of	the	Dalits.27		In	this	brief	excerpt,	Thirumavalavan	presents	identity	as	the	chief	dimension	of	the	Dalit	political	struggle.	Both	the	means	and	goal	of	Thirumavalavan’s	project	of	Dalit	liberation	are	reflected	in	the	process	of	retrieving	Dalits’	fundamental	identity	as	“the	sons	of	the	soil”.	Tamil	linguistic	identity	here	features	as	an	essential	dimension	of	Dalit	identity	that	goes	unrecognized	in	the	pan-Indianist,	Ambedkarite	model	of	Dalit	politics.	Thirumavalavan’s	rhetorical	illustration	of	the	severity	of	this	error	as	“joining	hands	with	Hindutva	forces	and	making	a	scene”	alludes	to	the	implication	of	linguistic	identity	in	the	VCK’s	struggle	against	a	broader	ideological	complex.	In	contemporary	discourse,	the	term	“Hindutva”	principally	denotes	an	ideology	of	Hindu	nationalism	that	takes	the	cultural	and	
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intellectual	forms	associated	with	the	orthodox,	Brahmanical	Hindu	tradition	as	the	foundation	of	a	common	Indian	peoplehood	and	advocates	for	the	institutionalization	of	these	forms	in	the	cultural	policies	taken	by	the	Indian	national	government.	The	Bharatiya	Janata	Party	(BJP),	which	was	the	ruling	party	of	the	national	government	for	both	the	original	2014	Supreme	Court	jallikaṭṭu	ban	and	the	2016	decision	that	sparked	the	Marina	Beach	protests,	associates	itself	with	this	ideology.	Without	a	doubt,	the	VCK’s	use	of	the	term	“Hindutva”	is	in	one	sense	intended	to	operate	as	a	critique	of	this	Hindu	nationalist	political	agenda.	However,	like	the	mainstream	Ambedkarite	school,	the	VCK	also	posits	a	deeper	link	between	the	institution	of	hierarchical	caste	and	the	Hindu	religion	itself.	In	the	VCK’s	discourse,	“Hindutva”	comes	primarily	to	stand	for	the	Brahmanical	Hindu	religious-ideological	system	that	the	VCK	identifies	as	the	ultimate	root	of	caste	oppression.	The	VCK	departs	from	the	Ambedkarite	understanding	of	Hindutva	by	situating	this	religious-ideological	system	within	a	narrative	of	Tamil	sociocultural	history.	In	another	speech	in	Kandasamy’s	compilation,	Thirumavalavan	summarizes	this	narrative:	In	those	days	[i.e.,	in	the	days	of	the	great	dynasties	of	classical	Tamil	history],	the	Tamilians	were	the	rulers.	All	the	Chera,	Chola,	and	Pandya	kings	were	Tamilians.	But	no	one	can	deny	that	these	Chera,	Chola,	and	Pandya	kings	abetted	the	designs	and	conspiracy	of	the	Aryans	to	divide	Tamil	society,	to	defeat	it.	Listening	to	the	advice	of	the	Aryans,	the	kings	of	those	times	developed	and	patronized	religion.		They	changed	the	social	structures.		Having	captivated	the	rulers,	they	used	the	Tamilians	themselves	and	crippled	Tamil	social	organization.		Using	the	Tamil	rulers,	they	firmly	established	such	casteist	structures.		Gradually	they	made	the	Tamilians	into	Hindus.		They	made	them	forget	that	they	were	Tamilians.		That	is	why	today	the	Tamilians	feel	greater	pride	in	saying	that	they	are	Hindus	than	in	saying	that	they	are	Tamilians.		The	historical	truth	is	that	Tamilians	are	not	Hindus.		So,	if	the	Tamilians	have	to	revive	themselves	and	have	a	revival,	a	renaissance,	the	first	thing	is	for	them	to	realize	that	they	are	not	Hindus.		It	is	only	when	such	a	mindset	is	acquired	that	the	Tamilian	shall	renounce	caste;	he	shall	cut	away	the	remaining	domination;	he	shall	tear	away	the	bonds,	the	handcuffs	over	his	hands,	
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over	his	brains.		Living	his	life	as	a	Hindu,	a	Tamilian	can	never	destroy	caste.		Remaining	a	Hindu,	he	can	never	destroy	Aryanism	and	Brahminism.		He	cannot	defeat	Hindutva.		So,	we	need	to	do	the	work	of	making	each	and	every	Tamilian	realize	and	feel	he	or	she	is	a	Tamilian.”28		Through	its	connection	with	this	narrative,	the	VCK’s	project	of	protecting	and	retrieving	Tamil	cultural	identity	becomes	socially	complex	and	far-reaching.	Thirumavalavan	presents	the	social	ideology	of	caste	that	the	“Aryans”	of	this	historical	narrative	bring	into	the	Tamil	land	as	fundamentally	distinct	from	the	social	life	of	pre-Hindu	Tamil	society.	By	re-establishing	Tamil	society’s	connection	with	its	original,	non-Hindu	roots,	the	VCK	hopes	to	lead	Tamilians	to	reject	the	Hindu	socioreligious	structures	that	simultaneously	perpetuate	caste	oppression	and	distort	the	native	cultural	identity	of	the	Tamil	people.		In	the	same	way	that	this	narrative	connects	the	structure	of	caste	oppression	to	an	origin	outside	of	the	pre-Hindu	Tamil	social	sphere,	this	narrative	presents	Tamil	cultural	identity	as	engaged	in	a	fundamental	antagonism	with	Brahmanical	Hindu	ideology.	Authentic	Tamil	identity	becomes	defined	in	part	through	its	wholesale	rejection	of	this	ideological	system.	Indeed,	Thirumavalavan’s	many	impassioned	orations	exhorting	the	defense	of	the	Tamil	language	make	note	of	the	debasement	that	Tamil	faces	at	the	hands	of	Hindutva	and	its	proponents.	In	a	third	speech	in	Kandasamy’s	compilation,	Thirumavalavan	asks	his	audience	to	consider	the	cultural	implications	of	Hindu	Tamilians’	endorsement	of	Brahminical	Hindu	religious	authority:	So	when	can	Tamilians	unite?		When	they	realized	that	they	are	not	Hindus,	only	then	shall	they	be	united.		Tamilians	who	live	as	Hindus	can	at	no	point	of	time	be	
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integrated	as	Tamilians.		It	merely	means	that	unknown	to	themselves	they	accept	the	leadership	of	the	Brahmins.		From	where	did	the	Sankaracharya	[an	ultraconservative	religious	authority	based	at	a	religious	endowment	in	the	northern	Tamil	temple	city	of	Chidambaram]	get	the	guts	to	say	that	Tamil	is	a	
neecha	baasha	(language	of	the	low)-	though	he	is	eating	the	salt	of	this	land	and	living	in	the	protection	of	its	people?		Because	of	whose	grace	did	it	come?		It	came	from	the	‘low’	Tamilians	who	believe	themselves	to	be	Hindus.		Otherwise	can	the	Sankaracharya	roam	on	this	land,	after	having	said	that	Tamil	is	a	neecha	baasha?		Can	he	state	that	the	consecration	of	a	temple	cannot	be	performed	in	Tamil?29		Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK	understand	the	Brahminical	debasement	of	the	Tamil	language	and	culture	to	have	its	severest	effect	on	the	Tamil	Dalit	community,	which	is	the	community	most	victimized	by	the	Hindu	ideological	system	that	seeks	to	demean	and	subvert	native	Tamil	cultural	identity.	It	is	thus	the	Dalit	community	that	stands	to	benefit	the	most	from	the	uprooting	of	Hindutva	and	Brahmanical	Hindu	ideology	from	the	Tamil	land.	As	a	result	of	its	historical	exclusion	from	caste	Hindu	society,	the	Dalit	community	also	maintains	the	strongest	connection	among	all	Tamilians	with	the	indigenous	roots	of	Tamil	cultural	identity.	Thirumavalavan	declares,	for	example,	that	the	chēri,	the	Tamil	Dalit	caste	colony30,	is	the	place	where	the	least	Sanskritized	Tamil	is	spoken31	and	where	the	pre-Hindu	religious	attitudes	of	Tamil	society	are	most	apparent.32	As	such,	“chēri	makkaḷ”	(“colony	people”),	one	of	Thirumavalavan’s	favorite	terms	for	the	Dalit	community,33	is	a	multisemic	label	that	simultaneously	invokes	the	ghettoization	and	socioeconomic	oppression	of	the	Dalit	community	and	the	cultural	identity	of	the	Dalit	colony	as	a	refuge	for	the	sociocultural	forms	of	indigenous	Tamil	civilization.				
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The Dravidianist Historical Narrative 	Thirumavalavan’s	public	statements	of	VCK	ideology	make	it	clear	that	the	VCK	understands	the	struggle	for	Dalit	liberation	in	Tamil	Nadu	as	a	conflict	between	the	indigenous	sociocultural	system	of	the	Tamil	land	and	the	Brahminical	system	of	Hindutva	that	foreign,	“Aryan”	influence	introduced	to	native	Tamil	society.	The	respective	identities	of	these	systems	as	native	and	non-native	to	the	Tamil	country	are	able	to	stand	in	for	a	number	of	other	specific	antagonisms	between	the	two	systems.	The	term	“chēri	makkaḷ”	in	Thirumavalavan’s	rhetoric	indexes	multiple	dimensions	of	Tamil	Dalit	identity,	including	caste,	culture,	language,	and	economic	position34.	It	is	this	characteristic	of	the	VCK’s	ideology	of	caste	liberation	that	I	have	singled	out	as	the	defining	element	of	the	Dravidianist	genre	of	social	criticism.	Dravidianist	thought	situates	contemporary	Tamil	society	in	relation	to	a	discrete	narrative	of	ancient	South	Indian	civilizational	history	that	derives	in	large	part	from	Caldwell’s	account	in	his	Comparative	grammar	of	the	Dravidian	or	South-
Indian	family	of	languages.	Through	this	narrative,	numerous	social	mores,	cultural	forms,	religious	teachings,	and	demographic	identities	come	to	represent	the	fundamental	historical	antagonism	between	the	ancient,	native	society	of	the	Tamil	land	and	the	Sanskritic	social	model	associated	with	Brahmins	and	North	India.	The	characteristically	Dravidianist	telling	of	this	narrative,	which	is	first	advanced	in	the	work	of	chiefly	Vellala	and	Saiva	scholars	such	as	J.N.	Nallaswami	Pillai,	P.	Sundaram	Pillai,	runs	as	follows.	The	original	inhabitants	of	South	India	were	the	architects	of	a	great,	classical	civilization,	which	was	founded	on	enlightened	social	values	and	
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was	possessed	of	exceptional	cultural	and	intellectual	refinement.	This	civilization	was	the	home	of	the	ancient	Tamil	language	and	the	jewels	of	classical	Tamil	literature,	the	preeminent	artifacts	of	this	great	society	that	survive	to	the	present	day.	At	some	time	in	the	ancient	past,	Aryan	immigrants	from	northward	lands	began	to	trickle	into	South	India,	where	they	introduced	the	religious-ideological	system	of	Brahminical	Hinduism.	The	interlopers	from	the	North	cheated	their	way	into	a	position	of	social	and	economic	dominance	over	ancient	Tamil	society	by	presenting	themselves	as	the	Brahmin	caste	community	at	the	top	of	the	Brahmanical	varṇāśramadharma	ritual	social	system,	and	forced	the	indigenes	of	South	India	into	social	and	cultural	servitude.			Christian	missionaries	stationed	in	the	Tamil	country	had	already	advanced	the	argument	that	the	Tamil	land	was	heir	to	a	distinctive	non-Sanskritic	cultural	legacy	more	than	a	century	prior	to	Caldwell’s	career35,	but	Caldwell’s	work	is	the	first	to	bring	this	historical	reading	into	dialogue	with	the	colonial-Indological	Aryan	Invasion	Theory,	a	reading	of	Indian	civilizational	history	that	had	been	a	dominant	consideration	in	European	political	and	intellectual	engagements	with	the	peoples	and	cultural	forms	of	the	colonial	territory	of	India	since	the	beginning	of	the	19th	Century.	19th-Century	recensions	of	the	Aryan	Invasion	Theory	combined	philological	evidence	demonstrating	the	existence	of	an	“Indo-European”	language	family	with	Indological	readings	of	ancient	Sanskrit-language	Vedic	literature	to	argue	that	a	light-skinned,	nomadic,	Sanskrit-speaking,	“Aryan”	people	entered	the	Indian	Subcontinent	from	the	north	or	the	northwest	and	laid	down	the	roots	of	all	
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forms	of	civilizational	greatness	and	high	culture	found	in	Indian	history.	In	the	process	of	migrating	into	the	Subcontinent,	the	ancient	Aryans	subjugated	or	displaced	the	dark-skinned,	savage,	culturally	bereft	indigenous	population	of	India.	While	Caldwell	maintained	the	division	that	the	Aryan	Invasion	Theory	drew	between	the	Aryan	civilization	and	the	native	peoples	of	India,	he	challenged	the	Aryan	Invasion	Theory’s	narrative	of	Indian	cultural	history.	Caldwell	argued,	in	line	with	earlier	missionary	appraisals	of	the	Tamil	literary-cultural	tradition,	that	the	society	of	the	ancient	Dravidian	South	demonstrated	a	high	degree	of	cultural	and	civilizational	refinement	that	owed	little	or	nothing	to	the	influence	of	the	Sanskritic,	Aryan	society	of	the	North.	Caldwell	thus	transformed	the	colonial	and	Indological	presumption	that	Aryan	society	was	the	sole	representative	of	high	culture	in	the	Indian	Subcontinent	into	a	narrative	of	Indian	cultural	history	that	allowed	for	civilizational	pluralism	and	implied	a	history	of	civilizational	competition.	
The Dravidianist Symbolic Network 	I	have	chosen	the	label	“Dravidianism”	to	reflect	Dravidianist	movements’	common	foundation	in	Caldwell’s	account	of	ancient	South	Indian	civilizational	history.	Dravidianist	discourse	weaves	a	web	of	social,	cultural,	and	religious	associations	(see	Appendix	2)	around	the	Dravidian	society	of	Caldwell’s	narrative	and	its	opposite	in	the	Aryan,	Sanskritic	society	of	the	North.	Social	equity,	classical	Tamil	literature,	enlightened	religious	attitudes,	a	productive	and	equitable	economic	order,	and	the	non-Brahmin	caste	communities	of	the	Tamil	land	are	among	the	features	associated	with	the	civilization	of	the	ancient	Tamil	land.	In	turn,	Sanskritic	
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civilization	is	characterized	by	what	Dravidianist	thought	understands	as	the	exact	opposite	of	each	of	these	features:	namely,	Brahmin	social	and	economic	dominance,	the	Sanskrit	language,	superstitious	and	corrupt	religious	texts	and	practices,	Brahmin	economic	freeloading	and	extortion,	and	the	Brahmin	caste	community	itself.	Because	the	specific	characteristics	of	the	indigenous	Tamil	and	Brahmanical	civilizations	all	point	to	the	fundamental	antagonism	between	these	two	ancient	peoples,	referring	to	any	given	feature	of	either	civilization	not	only	invokes	its	ideological	and	civilizational	opposite,	but	also	alludes	to	the	other	dimensions	that	distinguish	the	two	civilizations.		Hence,	for	example,	since	Dravidianist	discourse	understands	the	classical	Tamil	literary	tradition	as	a	defining	feature	of	ancient	Tamil	civilization,	classical	Tamil	literature	becomes	representative	of	the	equitable	social,	economic,	and	religious	values	of	classical	Tamil	society,	as	well	as	the	non-Brahmin	communities	of	the	Tamil	land	who	are	that	society’s	present-day	descendants.	Similarly,	Dravidianism	takes	classical	Tamil	literature	to	be	fundamentally	opposed	to	the	orthodox	Hindu	varṇāśramadharma	system,	śāstric	Sanskrit	literature,	the	Brahmin	community,	and	so	on.			The	terms	of	individual	Dravidianist	projects	determine	which	of	these	dimensions	become	the	primary	reflections	of	the	absolute	division	between	Dravidian	and	Aryan	civilization.	At	any	point	a	Dravidianist	project	is	free	to	invoke	any	dimension	of	this	civilizational	divide	in	service	of	another.	Therefore,	for	example,	although	Periyar’s	thought	generally	places	little	importance	on	the	linguistic	distinction	between	Tamil	and	Sanskrit,	Periyar	also	is	free	to	cite	the	Sanskrit	
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linguistic	origins	of	given	theological	terms	(such	as	ātmā	[Sk.	ātman]	and	mōṭcham	[Sk.	mokṣa])	to	forward	the	notion	that	Hindu	religion	is	an	Aryan	import	to	the	Dravidian	land.36	Similarly,	in	a	short	text	entitled	Vēḷāḷar	Nāgarigam,	Maraimalai	Adigal	is	able	to	transfer	his	principally	intellectual	and	theological	focus	on	ancient	Tamil	civilization	to	a	discrete	economic	order:	the	enlightened	Saiva	values	of	ancient	Tamil	civilization	become	the	result	of	a	productive,	sedentary,	agricultural	society	disrupted	by	the	invasion	of	uncouth	and	violent	nomadic	Aryans	from	the	north.		It	is	evident	from	the	sorts	of	characteristics	associated	with	the	Tamil/Dravidian	and	Aryan/Brahmin	civilizations	in	Dravidianist	discourse	that	Dravidianism	does	not	approach	the	ancient	civilizational	history	of	the	Tamil	land	on	neutral	ground.	The	Dravidianist	telling	of	Caldwell’s	narrative	is	characterized	by	its	investment	of	Caldwell’s	history	with	a	morally	laden	project	of	social	reform.	Dravidianist	thinkers	understand	the	Aryan/Brahmin	conquest	of	indigenous	Tamil	society	as	the	root	cause	of	a	bevy	of	social	ills	facing	the	descendants	of	this	native,	Tamil-speaking	society	in	the	present	day.	Dravidianist	activist	projects	hold	that	the	present-day	descendants	of	the	great	indigenous	civilization	of	South	India	must	reconnect	with	the	glory	of	their	past	in	order	to	be	relieved	of	the	burden	imposed	on	them	by	the	structures	of	Aryan/Brahmin	domination.	Dravidianist	projects	advance	their	readings	of	the	cultural	and	social	norms	of	classical,	indigenous	Tamil	society	as	the	premier	remedy	to	the	ills	facing	these	contemporary	descendants	of	the	original	inhabitants	of	the	Tamil	country.	This	reformist	
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component	of	the	Dravidianist	narrative	adds	a	strong	moral	charge	to	the	qualities	associated	with	the	two	opposed	civilizations	of	Caldwell’s	civilizational	history.	To	be	sure,	a	degree	of	moral	valence	was	already	present	in	Caldwell’s	work,	given	that	the	missionary	project	was	well	served	by	discrediting	Brahmanical	Hinduism,	which	was	the	source	of	the	most	organized	and	comprehensive	resistance	to	Christian	missionization.	However,	while	Caldwell’s	work	is	ultimately	a	scholarly	one,	and	the	majority	of	Caldwell’s	argument	speaks	to	the	technical	concerns	of	colonial	comparative	philology,	Dravidianist	thought	is	fundamentally	and	inescapably	activist37	in	nature.	Dravidianist	movements	and	thinkers	are	principally	concerned	with	effecting	social,	cultural	and/or	political	change	to	bring	contemporary	Tamil	society	in	line	with	the	values	of	ancient	Tamil	or	Dravidian	society.	This	moral	charge	derives	in	large	part	from	the	critical	role	that	foundational	Tamil	scholars	of	Sangam	literature	such	as	U.V.	Swaminatha38,	C.	Damodaram	Pillai,	and	P.	Sundaram	Pillai	played	in	incorporating	Caldwell’s	narrative	into	a	more	developed	articulation	of	the	cultural	distinctiveness	of	the	Tamil	classical	tradition.	However,	it	was	through	the	Dravidianist	conversion	of	this	emotionally	invested	but	principally	intellectual	narrative	into	a	symbolic	and	ideological	foundation	for	Dravidianist	activism	that	these	scholars’	cultural	reading	of	Tamil	classical	history	became	connected	to	a	reading	of	present-day	Tamil	society.		Dravidianist	movements	and	thinkers	present	readings	of	the	core	Dravidianist	narrative	of	history	that	reflect	the	specific	social	and	intellectual	goals	of	their	
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projects.	In	doing	so,	Dravidianist	movements	distill	the	broad	qualities	associated	with	the	society	of	the	ancient	Dravidians	in	the	core	Dravidianist	narrative	into	specific	characteristics.		For	example,	while	all	Dravidianist	discourse	understands	ancient	Tamil	civilization	to	embody	a	rational	and	enlightened	approach	to	religion,	the	specific	form	that	these	values	take	varies	drastically	among	the	major	projects	of	Dravidianist	social	criticism.	Iyothee	Thass	identified	these	rational	and	enlightened	values	as	the	egalitarian	ethical	values	of	Buddhism,	which	he	took	to	directly	contradict	the	hierarchical	and	self-serving	logic	of	the	Brahmanical	
varṇāśramadharma	system	that	underwrites	the	oppression	of	the	Dalit	communities	of	the	Tamil	country.	Maraimalai	Adigal	in	turn	found	these	values	in	a	reformed,	monotheist	brand	of	Saivism	that	cast	aside	superstitious	and	fanciful	Sanskritic	Hindu	texts	and	rituals	in	favor	of	the	elegant	and	grounded	texts	of	the	Tamil	Saiva	tradition.	Periyar	described	the	enlightened	and	rational	religious	values	of	the	ancient	Dravidians	as	a	brand	of	atheist	rationalism	not	yet	corrupted	by	the	Hindu	religious	culture	introduced	by	self-interested	Brahmins	to	deceive,	domesticate,	and	despoil	native	Dravidian	society.	Each	of	these	formulations	reflects	the	Dravidianist	activist	project	in	which	it	is	situated.			To	some	extent,	Dravidianist	movements	are	also	responsible	for	determining	which	caste	communities	in	the	contemporary	Tamil	country	are	the	chief	heirs	of	the	Dravidian	civilizational	legacy.	All	Dravidianist	movements	implicate	the	entire	non-Brahmin	community	of	the	Tamil	land	in	their	reform	projects,	but	Dravidianist	movements	also	often	slip	into	lending	particular	focus	to	the	historical	role	of	a	
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more	narrowly	defined	caste	group	in	the	establishment	of	the	historical	character	of	Dravidian	civilization.	The	particular	caste	communities	that	Dravidianist	thinkers	and	movements	select	for	this	focus	are	to	a	large	extent	reflective	of	the	thinkers’	own	caste	positionalities.	We	have	already	seen	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK	establish	Dalits	as	the	quintessential	“sons	of	the	soil”	of	the	Tamil	land,	although	the	VCK	simultaneously	presents	its	platform	as	a	defense	against	the	cultural,	political,	and	social	degradation	of	the	entire	Tamil	land	at	the	hands	of	Hindutva	and	Brahminism.	While	Thass	understood	his	Dravidianist	project	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	entire	Tamil	“Untouchable”	community	–	and	in	a	broader	sense,	to	effect	the	regeneration	of	Tamil	society	as	a	whole	–	Thass	also	spoke	of	his	own	Paraiyar	jāti	community	in	particular	as	the	descendants	of	the	moral	and	religious	leaders	of	ancient	Tamil	Buddhist	society.	Indeed,	Thass’s	movement	appealed	primarily	to	the	urban-based	Paraiyar	community	over	other	Dalit	jāti	communities	in	Madras	Presidency,	most	prominently	the	chiefly	rural	Arundhatiyar	community.	The	Paraiyar	community’s	access	to	cosmopolitan	colonial	urban	centers	allowed	Paraiyars	to	benefit	from	economic	and	educational	opportunities	not	available	to	agrarian	Tamil	Dalits,	many	of	whom	were	trapped	in	exploitative	labor	relationships	with	caste-Hindu	landowners,39	and	these	educational	and	economic	opportunities	provided	members	of	the	Paraiyar	community	with	the	requisite	literacy	to	engage	with	Thass’s	elevated	and	primarily	written	religious	discourse.40	Adigal’s	Veḷāḷar	Nāgarigam	presents	the	agriculturalist	Vellalar	jāti	as	the	community	responsible	for	the	cultural	majesty	and	ethics	of	non-violence	that	animated	classical	Tamil	civilization.	While	the	
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association	of	the	Vellalar	community	with	classical	Tamil	civilization	predates	Adigal’s	work	and	in	part	reflects	Vellalars’	history	of	social	influence	in	the	Tamil	country41,	it	is	also	true	that	Adigal’s	father	was	of	Vellalar	caste42,	as	were	several	of	the	important	religious	influences	of	Adigal’s	earlier	life43	and	much	of	the	support	base	of	his	religious	reform	movement.	Vellalars	such	as	the	literary	historian	P.	Sundaram	Pillai	were	the	principal	early	developers	of	a	Dravidianist	literary	history	centered	in	the	classics	of	Sangam	literature,	and	the	special	association	between	the	Vellalar	community	and	high	Tamil	civilization	-	which	was	already	present	in	Sangam	literature44	-	meant	that	Adigal’s	valorization	of	Tamil	classicism	worked	to	the	especial	benefit	of	the	Vellalar	community.45	The	non-Brahmin	ideology	associated	with	the	Justice	Party	of	early	20th-Century	Madras	Presidency	politics	–	an	organization	we	will	examine	in	more	detail	shortly	–	in	a	similar	way	principally	reflected	the	interests	of	the	Vellalar	community	and	other	privileged-caste	non-Brahmin	caste	communities.	While	the	Justice	Party’s	advocacy	for	non-Brahmin	interests	was	occasionally	extended	to	incorporate	Dalit	interests,	this	move	was	never	unanimously	supported	within	the	party	and	did	not	consistently	find	reflection	in	the	Justice	Party’s	policy	platform.	Periyar’s	thought	disregards	jāti	entirely,	instead	focusing	on	the	identity	of	all	non-Brahmin	Dravidians	as	Shudras	(Sk.	śūdra)	in	the	Brahminical	varṇāśramadharma	system.	Periyar’s	exclusive	focus	on	varṇa	is	well	explained	by	his	thought’s	focus	on	confronting	and	dismantling	the	Hindu	ideological	complex	of	Brahminism,	but	Periyar’s	understanding	of	Shudra	identity	as	a	blanket	term	applying	to	both	the	caste	and	casteless	(i.e.,	Dalit)	communities	of	the	South	may	also	in	part	reflect	
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Periyar’s	wealthy,	intermediate-caste	jāti	background.	To	be	sure,	one	of	the	characteristic	features	of	Periyar’s	career	was	his	advocacy	for	Dalit	community	rights:	his	first	honorary	title	was	“The	Hero	of	Vaikom”	in	recognition	of	his	agitation	for	the	Dalit	community	of	that	city	in	modern-day	Kerala46,	and	he	consistently	supported	Dalit	political	enfranchisement	in	both	his	own	organizations	and	in	official	government	postings.47	However,	in	a	scattering	of	incidents	during	his	career,	most	prominently	exemplified	in	his	refusal	to	support	a	bill	outlawing	the	South	Indian	devadasi	temple	courtesan	system	that	overwhelmingly	affected	women	from	the	Dalit	community48,	Periyar	seemed	to	subvert	Dalit	interests	to	a	broader	conception	of	Shudra	political	and	social	unity	that	did	not	always	reflect	the	perspectives	of	Dalits	in	the	movement.		
Dravidianism and the Society of Madras Presidency 	While	jāti	identity	plays	a	clear	role	in	most	Dravidianist	social	and	intellectual	projects,	I	have	already	made	the	contention	that	Dravidianist	movements	cannot	be	understood	simply	as	caste	movements.	Rather,	I	take	the	influence	of	jāti	identity	on	Dravidianist	thought	to	be	an	important	but	not	exclusive	dimension	of	the	material	social	environment	that	informed	the	construction	of	a	simultaneously	civilizational,	linguistic,	economic,	racial,	and	caste-relevant	Dravidianist	genre	of	social	critique.	In	a	broader	sense,	while	the	Dravidianist	telling	of	Caldwell’s	narrative	is	the	basis	for	the	cohesion	of	the	associated	characteristics	of	the	Dravidianist	genre	of	Tamil	reformist	thought,	the	features	of	the	core	Dravidianist	
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associative	framework	derive	much	of	their	character	from	the	colonial	historical	social	context	in	which	Dravidianist	thinkers	and	their	supporters	were	situated.	Some	characterizations	made	in	Protestant	missionary	literature,	such	as	the	association	of	Brahmanical	Hinduism	with	self-interested	and	deceptive	Brahmin	priests	and	the	opposition	of	Tamil	religious	literature	to	the	pan-Indian	Sanskritic	textual	tradition49,	were	already	reflected	to	some	extent	in	Caldwell’s	work	and	had	a	direct	influence	on	the	development	of	some	of	the	features	of	the	Dravidianist	framework.	The	writings	of	George	Uglow	(G.U.)	Pope,	a	Protestant	missionary	active	after	Caldwell’s	time	who	continues	to	be	celebrated	in	modern	Tamil	Nadu	as	a	legendary	lover	of	the	Tamil	language50,	advanced	an	elegant	formulation	of	a	preexisting	missionary	understanding	of	the	Tamil	Saiva	Siddhanta	religious	tradition	as	the	grounded	opposite	to	the	excessively	abstract	and	fanciful	Vedantic	theology	associated	with	South	Indian	Smārta	Brahmin	religious	practice.51	Maraimalai	Adigal	in	particular	cites	Pope’s	writings	in	support	of	his	Dravidianist	religious	reform	project.52	However,	these	conceptualizations	were	recast	and	placed	alongside	a	range	of	new	associations	as	Dravidianist	thought	abstracted	symbolism	from	missionary	discourse	to	speak	on	the	social	and	cultural	issues	affecting	late-19th	and	20th-Century	colonial	Tamil	society.		The	chief	dimension	in	which	Dravidianist	thought	reformulates	the	Protestant	missionary	orientation	of	Caldwell	and	others	is	in	its	translation	of	religious	Protestantism	to	a	broader	rationalist	and	modernist	sensibility	characteristic	of	colonial	intellectual	discourse.	In	this	sense,	Dravidianist	thought	follows	a	pattern	
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typical	of	modernist	reform	movements	across	the	colonial	world,	most	notably	the	neo-Vedantic	Hindu	reform	movements	associated	with	figures	such	as	Swami	Vivekananda	and	the	modernist	Islamic	movements	and	thinkers	both	within	India	(e.g.,	Syed	Ahmed	Khan	and	his	Anglo-Oriental	College	at	Aligarh)	and	elsewhere	in	the	colonized	Muslim	world.	Colonial-era	Dravidianist	thought	relies	heavily	on	a	range	of	characteristically	modern	assumptions	and	valuations	shared	by	many	of	these	movements.	Among	the	most	important	of	these	characteristically	modern	traits	in	Dravidianist	thought	are	the	appeal	to	knowledge	produced	by	the	disciplines	of	colonial	science	–	notably	archaeology	and	literary	criticism,	in	addition,	obviously,	to	the	discipline	of	philology	in	which	Caldwell	participated	–	the	valuation	of	material	and	technological	accomplishment,	the	appeal	to	rational	principles	of	social	organization	and	administrative	rule,	and	the	opposition	of	intellectual	rationalism	to	a	fraught	concept	of	religious-magical	superstition.	It	is	no	coincidence	that	the	seminal	thinkers	of	Dravidianist	thought	were	active	readers	of	English-language	literature	and	demonstrated	some	degree	of	affinity	for	English	and	European	high	culture.	Studies	of	Periyar’s	thought	–	including	histories	from	within	Periyar’s	own	movement53	–	universally	cite	the	famous	English	philosopher	Bertrand	Russell’s	rationalist	atheism	as	a	foundational	influence	of	Periyar’s	own	atheist	philosophy.	Periyar	held	a	general	admiration	for	the	rational	basis	of	European	thought	and	held	the	English	language	in	high	esteem	for	the	ease	with	which	it	communicated	scientific	and	technical	information.	Maraimalai	Adigal	poured	a	veritable	fortune	into	his	personal	library	of	English-language	works	of	fiction,	non-fiction,	and	poetry,	and	recorded	his	responses	to	these	works	in	detail	
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in	his	personal	diaries,	which	he	kept	in	English.54	Adigal	was	consistently	effusive	in	his	praise	for	the	English	intellectual	tradition,	and	engaged	in	personal	correspondence	with	several	European	thinkers	he	particularly	admired.55		To	a	large	extent,	the	Dravidianist	thought	of	the	colonial	era	sought	to	bring	Tamil	society	into	accordance	with	European	visions	of	modernity.	Colonial-era	Dravidianist	thought	also	drew	a	connection	between	European	modernity	and	the	explicitly	political	and	administrative	dimension	of	British	colonial	power.	All	major	colonial-era	Dravidianist	thinkers	praised	British	colonial	rule	as	consistent	with	the	modernist	social	values	through	which	the	British	colonial	authority	derived	its	ideological	justification.	It	would	be	a	mistake,	however,	to	understand	this	Dravidianist	endorsement	of	the	colonial	rule	as	a	passive	and	uncritical	acceptance	of	the	British	colonialist	project.	While	it	is	undeniable	that	key	Dravidianist	thinkers	had	a	deep	personal	respect	for	European	thought	and	artistic	culture,	Dravidianism	primarily	appealed	to	colonial	power	and	the	European	intellectual	and	cultural	conventions	associated	with	it	as	an	instrument	to	achieve	a	variety	of	material	and	social	goals.	In	a	direct	sense,	colonial	legal	and	administrative	intervention	could	be	brought	to	bear	on	material	instances	of	caste	discrimination	and	other	social	injustices.	Iyothee	Thass’s	effusive	praise	for	British	colonial	rule,	for	instance,	was	representative	of	a	broader,	principally	urban	Tamil	Dalit	understanding	of	both	the	British	administration	and	Protestant	missionary	groups	as	liberators	of	the	Dalit	community	from	caste	oppression,	and	this	understanding	derived	directly	from	the	urban	Tamil	Dalit	community’s	experience	of	colonial	
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rule.56	Indeed,	even	as	the	colonial	government	institutionalized	and	expanded	the	social	reach	of	Brahminical	practices	of	untouchability	as	part	of	its	broader	institutionalization	of	textual	Brahminical	social	codes,	the	colonial	administrative	machine	also	largely	disregarded	the	occupational	or	purity	restrictions	enforced	in	Tamil	caste	Hindu	communities,	which	fact	allowed	Dalit	communities	a	degree	of	social	and	economic	mobility	unavailable	in	pre-colonial	Tamil	society.57	Moreover,	the	colonial	government	was	periodically	receptive	to	legislating	against	discriminatory	caste	practices	as	part	of	a	broader	colonial	project	of	social	reform	situated	in	an	Enlightenment	discourse	of	human	rights	and	rational	social	order.58			To	a	considerable	extent,	all	colonial-era	Dravidianist	movements	shared	Thass’s	favorable	attitude	towards	the	material	conditions	of	colonial	rule	–	although	Periyar	in	particular	was	somewhat	more	reserved	in	this	respect.59	Significantly,	all	Dravidianist	movements	and	thinkers	after	Thass	(whose	career	occurred	before	the	real	emergence	of	Indian	nationalism	in	Madras	Presidency)	agreed	that	the	prospect	of	a	politically	united,	independent	Indian	nation	as	advocated	by	the	Indian	National	Congress	was	a	far	greater	threat	to	Tamil	society	than	British	colonial	rule.	In	the	Dravidianist	estimation,	the	withdrawal	of	colonial	power	from	Madras	Presidency	would	stand	to	remove	the	only	potential	counterbalance	to	the	complete	Brahmin	dominance	of	Madras	Presidency	politics.	In	the	opening	decades	of	the	20th	Century,	the	Brahmin	population	of	Madras	Presidency,	which	accounted	for	some	3%	of	the	Presidency’s	overall	population,	held	a	decisive	and	often	overwhelming	majority	of	judicial,	administrative,	and	legislative	positions	in	the	
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colonial	government.60	This	situation	of	Brahmin	political	dominance	had	stemmed	from	several	processes	in	colonial	Indian	history.	On	one	hand,	Brahmins	had	a	reputation	among	colonial	authorities	as	capable	administrative	workers	–	at	least	compared	to	the	broader	Indian	public	–	and	colonial	hiring	practices	reflected	this	bias.61	To	a	certain	extent,	this	bias	resulted	from	a	real	social	advantage	that	the	Brahminical	tradition	of	textual	religious	education	gave	Brahmin	applicants	in	the	process	of	adapting	to	the	occupational	requirements	of	primarily	paper-based	colonial	bureaucracy.	However,	to	a	large	extent	Brahmin	material	dominance	was	also	implicated	in	colonial	administrators’	reliance	on	Brahmins	as	both	cultural	and	political	interpreters	in	their	engagement	with	Indian	societies62	and	communities,	a	role	that	the	Brahmin	community	enthusiastically	embraced.63			Brahmin	sociopolitical	dominance	in	Madras	Presidency	thus	went	hand-in-hand	with	the	place	of	privilege	that	colonial	authorities	and	European	Indologists	granted	the	Brahmanical	religious	and	intellectual	system	in	both	the	material	and	cultural	realms	of	colonial	India.64	This	sociopolitical	connection	between	Brahmin	material,	social,	and	economic	power	in	colonial	Madras	Presidency	meant	that	in	addition	to	the	legal	and	administrative	benefits	colonial	rule	presented	to	the	Tamil	non-Brahmin	community	(at	least	relative	to	Congress’s	India),	European	colonial	modernism	stood	as	a	puissant	alternative	to	the	cultural-ideological	system	of	Brahminism,	which	Dravidianist	movements	identified	as	the	primary	cause	for	the	social	and	cultural	ills	afflicting	the	contemporary	Tamil	non-Brahmin	community.	Colonial	power	invested	European	cultural	forms	and	modernist	ideology	with	a	
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sociocultural	currency	intelligible	both	to	Tamil	and	colonial	audiences	through	material	socioeconomic	presence	of	European	modernist	cultural	and	intellectual	sensibilities	in	colonial	India.	The	European	discourse	of	modernity	was	the	same	discourse	that	underwrote	colonial	administrative	policy65;	colonial	intellectual	and	material	engagement	with	Indian	and	Tamil	culture,	religion,	and	history;	and	indeed,	the	British	colonial	project	itself.	While	Dravidianist	movements’	commendations	of	the	material,	sociopolitical	benefits	of	British	rule	are	largely	reflected	in	the	petitions	they	make	to	the	colonial	government	for	specific	material	concessions	–	Thass’s	praise	of	the	colonial	government’s	enlightened	social	attitudes	reflects	his	long	history	petitioning	the	colonial	government	to	grant	administrative	and	legal	rights	to	the	Paraiyar	community,	just	as	Justice	Party	members’	praise	of	British	rule	as	even-handed	and	disinterested66	reflects	the	Justice	Party’s	campaign	to	secure	electoral	reservations	for	the	non-Brahmin	community	in	the	Madras	Presidency	legislature	–	Dravidianists’	affinity	for	European	ideological	and	cultural	modernism	does	not	translate	into	meaningful	material	campaigns	for	the	cultural	Europeanization	of	Tamil	society.	That	is	to	say,	while	Dravidianists	often	declared	that	Tamil	society	should	imitate	modern	European	society’s	scientism,	rationalism,	and	contemporary	artistic	accomplishment,	they	did	not	extend	this	imperative	to	mount	a	campaign	for	Tamil	society’s	adoption	of	European	cultural	forms.	Dravidianism’s	engagement	with	European	intellectual	and	cultural	modernism	is	neither	an	assimilationist	deference	to	English	cultural	superiority	nor	a	pragmatic	political	strategy	intended	to	win	the	favor	of	the	British	colonial	government.67	Indeed,	the	vast	majority	of	the	
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Dravidianist	engagement	with	modernism,	like	the	vast	majority	of	Dravidianist	thought	in	general,	appears	in	Tamil-language	Dravidianist	publications	obviously	not	intended	for	colonial	consumption.		The	primary	and	true	audience	of	Dravidianist	activism	is	the	Tamil	non-Brahmin	public,	and	the	ultimate	goal	of	Dravidianist	activism	is	to	effect	the	reform	of	Tamil	society	from	within.	Dravidianist	activism	works	not	simply	to	resolve	the	material	social	and	cultural	injustices	afflicting	the	Tamil	land,	but	also	to	convince	the	Tamil,	non-Brahmin	community	as	a	whole	to	reject	the	Aryan,	Brahmanical	ideological	and	cultural	system	at	the	root	of	these	injustices.	This	rejection	requires	Tamilians	to	recognize	Brahminism	and	Aryanism	as	fundamentally	foreign	to	Tamil	civilization.	In	a	cultural	sense,	Tamilians	must	recognize	that	the	Sanskritic	literature	and	art	associated	with	Brahminism	–	most	especially	Sanskrit-language	Puranic	mythology	–	is	not	characteristic	of	the	Tamil	civilizational	legacy.	In	a	social	sense,	Tamilians	must	understand	that	the	enforcement	of	the	Brahmanical	caste	hierarchy	in	contemporary	Tamil	society	–	whether	at	the	hands	of	Brahmins	or	non-Brahmins	–	stems	from	Aryan-Brahmin	influence	and	is	incompatible	with	the	social	ethics	of	classical	Tamil	civilization.	In	a	religious-theological	sense,	Tamilians	must	recognize	Brahmanical	Hinduism	either	as	a	fundamental	distortion	of	original	Dravidian	religion	or	as	a	Brahminical-Aryan	innovation	altogether.	68	In	a	historical	sense,	Tamilians	must	discard	the	history	of	North	Indian	Brahmanical	civilization	as	unconnected	to	the	history	of	Tamil	civilization	outside	of	the	Dravidianist	narrative	of	Aryan-Brahmin	invasion.	
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	And	so,	if	the	characteristic	Dravidianist	retelling	of	Robert	Caldwell’s	narrative	of	ancient	Dravidian	civilizational	history	is	the	ideological	basis	for	the	morally	charged,	dualistic	character	of	Dravidianist	thought;	and	if	the	sociopolitical	context	of	colonial-era	Madras	Presidency,	filtered	to	some	extent	through	the	specific	caste	positionalities	of	Dravidianist	authors,	is	the	primary	source	for	the	particular	characteristics	that	come	to	be	attributed	to	the	Dravidianist	associative	network;	then	the	concept	of	Tamil	ethnic	and	civilizational	identity	becomes	the	chief	battleground	on	which	Dravidianist	activist	campaigns	wage	war	against	Aryanism,	Brahminism,	and	Sanskritism.	The	diversity	of	specific	characteristics	that	Dravidianist	movements	attribute	to	the	broad	qualities	of	ancient	Tamil	and	Dravidian	civilization	is	one	of	the	primary	sources	of	the	important	symbolic	divergences	among	important	Dravidianist	ideological	formulations.	To	be	sure,	there	were	many	historical	convergences	among	Dravidianist	movements:	Periyar,	for	example,	reportedly	had	extensive	contact	and	close	personal	ties	with	members	of	Iyothee	Thass’s	movement,	and	Periyar’s	Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam	joined	forces	with	Maraimalai	Adigal’s	Saiva	reformists	to	mount	a	united	front	against	compulsory	Hindi	education	in	1938’s	famous	Anti-Hindi	Agitation.	However,	Dravidianist	movements	have	also	had	their	share	of	run-ins	over	the	specific	terms	of	their	reform	projects.	Periyar’s	Self-Respect	Movement	(Suyamariyādai	Iyakkam)	and	Adigal’s	Saiva	followers	had	numerous	and	often	vitriolic	confrontations,	which	at	one	point	had	to	be	tempered	by	the	exchange	of	personal	letters	of	apology	between	Periyar	and	Adigal	themselves.69	The	conflict	that	arose	between	the	
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followers	of	Periyar	and	Adigal	can	be	understood	as	a	disagreement	over	the	specific	religious	character	that	should	be	associated	with	Tamil	civilizational	identity.	The	religious	(or,	in	Periyar’s	case,	irreligious)	component	of	Periyar	and	Adigal’s	constructions	of	classical	Tamil	identity	had	implications	not	only	on	their	readings	of	Tamil	civilizational	history,	but	also,	given	the	characteristic	Dravidianist	association	between	the	Dravidian	past	and	the	activist	future,	on	the	agendas	they	forwarded	as	means	of	restoring	the	indigenous	Tamil	identity	of	contemporary	Tamil	society.				
Dravidianism, Tamil Nationalism, and Non-Brahmin Politics 	The	prominence	of	Dravidianist	ideology	and	rhetoric	in	Tamil	political	history	has	meant	that	Western	scholarly	engagements	with	Dravidianism	and	Dravidianist	movements	have	paid	special	attention	to	Tamil	political	and	organizational	reckonings	with	Tamil	identity	and	non-Brahmin	politics,	particularly	as	expressed	through	the	evolution	of	Tamil	political	culture	from	the	non-Brahmin	politics	of	the	Justice	Party	to	the	Tamil	nationalist	politics	of	the	Dravidian	parties.	However,	viewing	Dravidianist	ideas	through	an	exclusively	political	lens	misrepresents	the	character	of	Dravidianist	ideology.	As	I	have	contended	thus	far	in	this	paper,	both	non-Brahmin	caste	identity	and	Tamil	ethnocultural	identity	are	connected	through	the	Dravidianist	associative	network	to	a	range	of	other	dimensions	of	social	and	cultural	identity.	Considering	the	outsize	importance	that	Western	scholarship	has	placed	on	political	organizations	and	platforms	associated	ideologically	or	
		 37	
organizationally	with	Dravidianist	movements,	it	is	prudent	to	discuss	the	relationship	among	non-Brahmin	politics,	Tamil	nationalism,	and	classical	Dravidianist	thought.		In	seeking	to	define	or	explain	the	rise	of	the	“Dravidian”	political	paradigm	and	its	associated	rhetoric,	historical	studies	commonly	begin	the	substantive	part	of	their	discussions	with	the	emergence	of	the	South	Indian	Liberal	Federation-	much	more	commonly	known	as	the	“Justice	Party”	after	the	name	of	its	English-language	periodical-	in	colonial	Madras	Presidency	politics.	The	Justice	Party’s	foundation	in	1916	both	crystallized	and	accelerated	the	emergence	of	a	distinct	political	consciousness	among	a	group	of	primarily	privileged-caste,	non-Brahmin	notables	who	were	dissatisfied	with	the	disproportionate	representation	of	the	Brahmin	caste	community	in	regional	colonial	administration.	Members	of	the	Vellalar,	Nair,	Naidu,	Reddi,	and	Chettiyar	caste	communities	came	to	see	their	economic	and	political	interests	as	opposed	to	those	of	the	Brahmin	community,	and	began	to	demand	reservations	for	non-Brahmins	in	administrative	government	posts,	educational	institutions,	and	elected	regional	legislature.	The	issue	of	electoral	reservations	in	particular	became	a	major	site	of	engagement	between	Justice	Party	officials,	the	British	colonial	government,	and	notable	advocates	of	Brahmin	interests,	such	as	C.P.	Ramaswami	Iyer	and	Annie	Besant,	the	famous	leader	of	the	Madras-based	Home	Rule	Movement.	The	Montagu-Chelmsford	Reforms	of	1918,	which	transferred	authority	in	certain	realms	of	regional	administration	from	British	officers	to	locally	elected	or	appointed	Indian	officials,	presented	an	obvious	
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danger	to	those	sympathetic	to	the	Justice	Party’s	platform,	since	the	withdrawal	of	British	colonial	power	in	these	realms	of	administration	yielded	control	to	a	regional	government	dominated	by	Brahmins	at	all	levels.		A	long	legislative	struggle	over	the	issue	of	communal	reservations	in	the	Madras	Presidency	legislature	ensued,	during	which	a	delegation	of	Justice	Party	leaders	led	by	Dr.	T.M.	Nair,	one	of	the	co-founders	of	the	party,	traveled	to	Britain	to	plead	the	case	for	proportional	electoral	representation	directly	to	the	British	Parliament.	Facilitated	by	the	Indian	National	Congress’s	nationwide	boycott	of	colonial	government	elections,	the	Justice	Party	prevailed	in	the	1920	Madras	Presidency	elections	and	proceeded	to	form	a	government	that	forwarded	policies	intended	to	defend	the	material	and	cultural70	interests	of	the	Presidency’s	privileged-caste	non-Brahmin	communities.		From	the	beginning,	the	politics	of	non-Brahminism	associated	with	the	Justice	Party	were	situated	firmly	within	the	Dravidianist	symbolic	network.	More	than	a	decade	before	the	principally	privileged-caste	non-Brahmin	advocacy	tradition	emerged	in	the	colonial	center	of	Madras,	several	Dalit	activist	and	religious	reform	groups	had	adopted	the	term	“Dravidian”	as	an	alternative	marker	of	their	caste	community.	The	most	important	of	these,	naturally,	was	Iyothee	Thass’s	construction	of	Ādi	Drāviḍa	identity	through	his	Dalit	Buddhist	movement,	although	as	early	as	1886	a	“Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam”	(“Dravidian	Association”;	unaffiliated	with	Periyar’s	later	organization)	was	founded	for	Dalits	in	the	Nilgiri	Mountains.71	More	direct	spiritual	and	organizational	predecessors	of	the	Justice	Party’s	principally	
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privileged-caste	non-Brahminism	also	made	similar	connections.	Several	days	after	two	Madras-based,	non-Brahmin	lawyers	founded	1909’s	Madras	Non-Brahmin	Association,	a	short-lived	spiritual	predecessor	of	the	organization	that	would	become	the	Justice	Party,	a	letter	was	printed	in	the	Madras	Mail	suggesting	that	since	the	non-Brahmins	of	South	India	were	of	Dravidian	descent,	the	non-Brahmin	uplift	organization	might	more	appropriately	be	called	the	“Madras	Dravidian	Association”.72	This	name	would	appear	again	in	1912,	when	the	Madras	United	League,	an	organization	formed	to	advocate	for	non-Brahmins	employed	in	government	jobs,	changed	its	name	to	the	Madras	Dravidian	Association	following	a	suggestion	at	the	organization’s	first	meeting.73			Moreover,	the	Tamil	cultural	dimensions	of	non-Brahmin	caste	identity	in	Dravidianist	rhetoric	are	active	in	the	Justice	Party’s	usage	of	the	term.	Among	the	chief	policy	focuses	of	the	Justice	Party	was	its	advocacy	for	the	formal	instruction	of	South	Indian	vernacular	languages	in	both	primary	and	secondary	education.	The	Justice	Party	pushed	for	the	foundation	of	a	“Tamil	university”,	which	would	minister	to	the	regional	educational	needs	of	Tamilians,	foremost	among	which	was	the	philological	study	of	the	Tamil	language	and	classical	Tamil	literature.74	Justice	Party	affiliates	proposed	these	policies	in	order	to	challenge	the	particular	place	of	privilege	afforded	to	Sanskrit	in	the	curricula	and	faculty	hiring	practices	of	Madras	Presidency’s	educational	institutions.	Unsurprisingly,	Brahmins	were	the	chief	advocates	for	and	beneficiaries	of	Sanskrit-language	education,	in	reflection	of	both	the	ancient	Brahminical	tradition	of	Sanskrit-language	instruction	and	the	
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numerous	social	and	legal	privileges	that	the	Brahmin	community	enjoyed	as	a	result	of	the	British	institutionalization	of	Sanskritic	sociocultural	norms.75	While	the	material	benefits	of	the	Justice	Party’s	campaign	for	vernacular-language	instruction	–	namely,	providing	a	counterbalance	to	Brahmin	students’	advantaged	position	in	the	study	of	Sanskrit	and	challenging	the	broader	structure	of	Brahmin	privilege	in	Madras	Presidency	–	were	obviously	an	integral	element	of	the	rationale	behind	the	project,	Justice	Party	members	also	framed	the	project	of	promoting	Tamil	and	(to	a	lesser	extent)	other	vernacular	South	Indian	languages	as	a	defense	of	non-Brahmin	Dravidian	cultural	identity.	Hence,	Justice	Party	advocates	spoke	about	the	need	to	protect	and	preserve	their	linguistic	and	cultural	heritage.76	In	short,	the	Justice	Party’s	material	project	was	intimately	associated	with	an	immaterial,	culturally	focused	argument:	the	defense	of	Tamil	and	other	Dravidian	vernaculars	was	presented	as	an	end	in	itself.	The	relationship	between	the	two	rhetorical	framings	of	the	Justice	Party’s	argument	is	a	prototypical	example	of	the	multi-sited	network	of	Dravidianist	associations,	in	that	the	two	arguments	were	fully	in	concordance	and	more	or	less	interchangeable.	The	defense	of	Tamil	represented	the	defense	of	non-Brahmin	interests,	just	as	the	defense	of	non-Brahmin	interests	essentially	involved	the	defense	of	Tamil	and	Tamil-language	education.		In	addition	to	associating	privileged	non-Brahmin	interests	with	the	Dravidian	racial-civilizational	label,	the	Justice	Party	also	to	some	extent	embraced	a	characteristically	Dravidianist	rejection	of	the	Brahminical	varṇa	system.	While	a	
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faction	of	Justice	Party	members	led	by	the	party’s	co-founder	Theagoraya	Chetti	sought	to	advance	privileged-caste	non-Brahmin	interests	without	disrupting	Hindu	orthodoxy	or	traditional	caste	hierarchy	structures,	another	faction	led	by	T.M.	Nair,	the	other	co-founder	of	the	party,	situated	its	reform	project	within	a	broader	critique	of	caste	and	the	practice	of	untouchability.	This	faction	chiefly	framed	its	critique	of	caste	through	the	lens	of	Enlightenment-style	modernity.77	While	T.M.	Nair	and	other	members	did	not	generally	emphasize	a	connection	between	Dravidian	cultural	identity	and	abolition	of	the	varṇāśrama	system	–	Periyar’s	Self-Respect	Movement	poached	a	massive	segment	of	the	Justice	Party’s	base	several	years	later	with	its	own	explicit	argument	to	this	effect	–	the	Justice	Party’s	association	of	caste	reform	with	the	rationalist	sensibilities	of	European-style	modernism	is	a	characteristic	feature	of	the	Dravidianist	paradigm.			In	sum,	the	Justice	Party’s	rhetoric	and	policy	relied	to	a	significant	extent	on	a	characteristically	Dravidianist	understanding	of	the	“Dravidian”	label	and	its	association	with	both	non-Brahmin	caste	identity	and	a	claim	to	Tamil	indigeneity.	It	is	through	this	lens	that	we	should	evaluate	the	Justice	Party’s	influence	on	subsequent	political	and	rhetorical	articulations	of	Dravidianism.	To	be	sure,	beginning	a	description	of	Dravidian	politics	with	the	emergence	of	the	Justice	Party	certainly	has	historical	merit	in	its	own	right.	After	all,	Tamil	Nadu’s	modern	Dravidian	political	parties	are	direct	organizational	descendants	of	the	original	Justice	Party	through	the	Drāviḍa	Kaḻagam.	In	a	broader	sense,	the	political	priorities	and	policy	focuses	of	the	Justice	Party,	as	well	as	the	specific	sociopolitical	
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issues	to	which	they	responded,	set	the	tone	for	the	specific	brand	of	non-Brahmin	Tamil	nationalism	at	the	center	of	Dravidian	party	rhetoric.	However,	identifying	the	Justice	Party	as	the	original	source	of	the	rhetoric	of	the	Dravidian	parties	yields	several	inaccurate	assumptions	about	Justice	Party	political	ideology.	Foremost	among	these	missteps	is	the	reduction	of	the	ideology	of	the	Justice	Party	and	its	descendants	to	a	purely	political	and	opportunist	non-Brahminism	in	reflection	of	the	Justice	Party’s	most	immediate	and	obvious	policy	focus:	namely,	securing	the	material	welfare	of	principally	privileged-caste	non-Brahmins	in	Madras	Presidency.	The	most	extreme	forms	of	this	approach	dismiss	the	importance	of	the	Dravidianist	ideological	system	altogether,	instead	viewing	the	emergence	of	non-Brahmin	consciousness	in	Madras	Presidency	solely	as	the	result	of	a	set	of	discrete	and	immediate	political	interests	associated	with	the	privileged,	non-Brahmin	communities	that	formed	the	Justice	Party’s	base.	After	all,	one	of	the	most	important	political	events	of	the	closing	years	of	colonial	rule	over	the	Tamil	country	was	1938’s	agitation	against	the	establishment	of	compulsory	Hindi-language	education	in	Madras	Presidency,	a	principally	cultural	initiative.	This	event	brought	together	Periyar’s	Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam,	Maraimalai	Adigal’s	neo-Saiva	
Taṉittamiḻ	Iyakkam	(“Pure	Tamil	Movement”),	and	a	number	of	academic	figures	sympathetic	to	the	proto-Dravidianist	readings	of	Tamil	history	associated	with	P.	Sundaram	Pillai	and	similar	scholars.	Viḍudalai,	the	official	print	outlet	of	the	
Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam,	printed	editorials	and	cartoons	from	all	of	these	factions	that	railed	against	the	depredation	of	the	Tamil	language	at	the	hands	of	then-Chief	Minister	“Rajaji”	C.	Rajagopalachari	and	the	Indian	National	Congress.	This	incident	
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secured	Rajaji’s	resignation	and	set	the	example	for	the	massive	1965	Anti-Hindi	Agitation	that	propelled	the	DMK	to	victory	in	Tamil	Nadu	elections	and	signaled	the	beginning	of	the	Dravidian	parties’	dominance	of	Tamil	state	politics.			Just	as	the	term	“non-Brahmin”	in	Dravidianist	ideology	cannot	be	defined	exclusively	as	a	caste	identity,	Dravidianist	defenses	of	Tamil	linguistic	and	cultural	autonomy	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	purely	cultural	agenda.	Without	a	more	thorough	theorization	of	the	ethnic-linguistic-civilizational	dimension	of	the	“Dravidian”	label	that	underwrites	Dravidianist	social	activism,	protests	against	Hindi	imposition	in	Tamil	Nadu	appear	as	isolated	instances	of	regional	linguistic	chauvinism,	rather	than	the	product	(if	not	exclusively,	then	at	least	principally)	of	more	than	four	decades	of	Dravidianist	social	thought.	As	I	have	argued	above,	the	social	components	of	the	Dravidianist	engagement	with	Tamil	identity	distinguishes	the	Dravidianist	approach	from	the	strictly	cultural	Tamil	nationalism	embodied	in	the	rhetoric	of	the	Dravidian	parties.	Although	there	is	an	organizational	continuity	between	classically	Dravidianist	organizations	and	the	Dravidian	parties,	reading	Dravidianist	thought	through	the	Dravidian	parties’	largely	rhetorical	cultural	Tamil	nationalism	leads	to	a	fatal	misrepresentation	of	the	discursive	function	of	Tamil	identity	in	Dravidianist	thought.			The	“Dravidian”	label	cited	in	the	names	of	the	two	“Dravidian”	parties	of	Tamil	politics	–	i.e.,	the	DMK	and	the	AIADMK	–	most	directly	reflects	the	two	parties’	
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common	descent	from	the	Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam	(“Dravidian	Association”),	a	Dravidian	nationalist	social	organization	founded	by	Periyar	out	of	the	remains	of	the	largely	moribund	Justice	Party.	While	little	of	Periyar’s	prototypically	Dravidianist	social	agenda	has	been	preserved	in	the	Dravidian	parties’	political	platforms,	which	scholars	generally	describe	as	essentially	populist	rather	than	ideological78,	the	Dravidian	parties	deploy	a	rhetoric	that	draws	deeply	from	Dravidianist	symbolism.	The	early	DMK	propaganda	machine,	paradigmatically	associated	with	the	pro-Tamil	symbolism	of	mainstream	Tamil-language	films	such	as	Parasakti	(1952)79,	invoked	a	highly	emotive	brand	of	Tamil	linguistic	and	cultural	nationalism	that	fed	into	the	DMK’s	leading	role	in	1967’s	famous	statewide	protests	against	the	(subsequently	reversed)	establishment	of	Hindi	as	the	sole	official	language	of	the	Indian	government.			Bernard	Bate’s	sterling	2009	study	of	the	distinctive	rhetoric	associated	with	the	Dravidian	parties	demonstrates	the	importance	of	the	classical	Tamil	past	in	Dravidian	politicians’	self-presentation	as	representatives	of	the	Tamil	cultural	tradition.	Bate	argues	that	by	employing	markedly	elevated	and	archaic	language,	Dravidian	party	orators	attempt	to	set	themselves	above	and	apart	from	the	rank	and	file	of	Tamil	society.	Following	this	line	of	argument,	Bate	links	the	speech	patterns	that	Dravidian	party	orators	and	their	supporters	use	to	conventions	associated	with	Tamil	bhakti	literature.	Dravidian	party	orators’	attempts	to	evoke	the	Tamil	classical	past	through	elevated	rhetoric	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	the	rhetorical	conventions	associated	with	classical	Dravidianist	thought.	Bate,	echoing	
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other	observers	of	Periyar’s	oratorical	style,	notes	that	Periyar	delivered	his	speeches	in	a	colloquial	and	folksy	tone,	which	he	punctuated	with	frequent	rhetorical	questions	and	abrasive	and	occasionally	vulgar	humor.	The	popular	accessibility	of	Periyar’s	rhetorical	style	is	somewhat	extreme	relative	to	other	examples	of	Dravidianist	oratory:	Maraimalai	Adigal’s	speeches	and	writings,	for	example,	were	largely	inaccessible	to	uneducated	audiences	due	to	his	use	of	occasionally	obscure	pure	Tamil	vocabulary.	However,	as	a	whole,	the	priority	of	Dravidianist	oratory	is	to	further	Dravidianist	thinkers’	discrete	social	and	cultural	activist	projects.	We	have	seen	this	above	in	excerpts	from	Thirumavalavan’s	speeches	on	the	defense	of	Tamil	cultural	identity.	Rather	than	invoking	the	classical	Tamil	past	symbolically	as	a	marker	of	political	legitimacy	in	the	style	of	the	Dravidian	parties’	political	rhetoric,	Dravidianist	oratory	invokes	Tamil	classicism	as	an	index	of	the	range	of	connected	discursive	terms	and	symbologies	developed	through	the	Dravidianist	narrative	of	Tamil	history.	As	we	have	seen	above	with	the	platform	of	Dalit	liberation	advanced	by	Thirumavalavan	and	the	VCK,	conceiving	of	Dravidianist	politics	as	a	merger	of	a	social	platform	of	caste	reform	with	a	platform	of	Tamil	cultural	nationalism	obscures	the	intrinsic	connection	between	these	dimensions	of	Dravidianist	activism.			
	
Conclusion: Who are the Tamilians? 	My	preeminent	intellectual	concern	in	this	piece	has	been	to	label,	describe,	and	explain	what	I	have	identified	as	an	important	ideological	and	symbolic	structure	in	modern	Tamil	social	discourse.	In	pursuing	this	task,	I	have	consistently	pushed	
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against	framings	of	Dravidianist	movements	that	fail	to	take	into	account	all	of	the	dimensions	in	which	their	ideologies	and	symbologies	are	resonant.	Most	importantly,	I	have	contended	that	Tamil	cultural	identity	plays	a	rich,	multisemic	role	in	Dravidianist	ideology	that	indexes	a	range	of	dimensions	of	cultural	and	social	identity.			Tamil	identity	continues	to	play	a	major	role	in	Tamilians’	engagement	with	Tamil	and	Indian	society.	The	volativity	of	the	jallikaṭṭu	issue	in	Tamil	Nadu	is	a	testament	to	the	continuing	importance	of	a	notion	of	Tamil	cultural	autonomy	in	a	popular	sense	as	well	as	in	the	important	academic	and	political	engagements	with	the	idea	in	the	20th	and	21st	Century	Tamil	country.	By	centering	Tamil	identity	in	my	analysis	of	Dravidianism,	I	hope	to	stimulate	Western	scholarship’s	engagement	with	Tamil	identity	as	a	social	and	political	force	in	itself.	English-language	Western	scholarship	has	an	overwhelming	tendency	to	understand	Tamil	Nadu	through	a	pan-Indian	lens	and	to	connect	elements	of	Tamil	culture	to	referents	in	the	broader	Indian	cultural	and	social	past.	Lost	in	the	fray	are	the	voices	–	loud	voices	–	that	present	Tamil	identity	as	something	separate,	something	that	deserves	to	be	reckoned	with	on	its	own	terms.			In	addition	to	the	prominence	of	discursive	constructions	of	Tamil	identity	in	Dravidianist	thought,	my	concern	with	representing	this	Tamilian	perspective	is	motivated	by	my	personal	encounters	with	Tamilian	cultural	self-perception.	In	numerous	academic	and	casual	conversations	in	both	English	and	Tamil,	I	have	
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encountered	Tamilians	of	all	social	and	religious	persuasions	beckoning	to	the	characteristic	traits	of	Tamil	identity,	the	things	that	make	the	Tamil	tradition	not	only	rich,	but	also	unique.	In	defining	Dravidianism	on	its	own	terms,	I	hope	to	push	the	Western	academy	to	engage	with	the	fact	that	Tamilians	have	a	broad	and	strong	concept	of	Tamil	identity	that	stands	on	its	own	terms,	and	often	stands	in	opposition	to	nationalist	framings	of	Tamil	cultural	and	political	identity.	This	cannot	accurately	be	defined	as	political	nationalism	or	ethnic	“sub-nationalism”,	since	many	of	the	people	declaring	this	identity	make	no	direct	political	claims	against	the	Indian	nation.	Rather,	there	is	a	concept	circulating	in	Tamil	society	that	the	Tamil	people	have	a	distinctive	identity	as	a	people,	an	identity	that	is	indexed	through	the	Tamil	language,	Tamil	classical	literature,	Tamil	civilizational	history,	and	Tamil	religious	expressions.	My	experience	has	always	been	that	Tamilians	of	all	social	positions	are	always	eager	to	talk	about	what	it	means	to	be	Tamil,	regardless	of	the	directions	their	personal	deliberations	on	Tamil	identity	take	them.	While	I	do	not	intend	to	present	my	readings	of	this	experience	as	above	scrutiny,	without	bias,	or	as	the	reflection	of	anyone’s	deliberation	but	my	own	–	my	observations	cohere	with	some	of	the	most	apparent	traits	of	the	Dravidianist	subject	matter	I	have	covered	in	this	paper.	All	Dravidianist	thinkers	are	preoccupied	with	what	it	means	to	be	authentically	Tamil,	and	this	preoccupation	corresponds	to	a	number	of	instances	in	history,	both	ancient	and	recent,	when	this	preoccupation	resulted	in	real	historical	articulations	of	Tamil	cultural	distinctiveness.	To	treat	the	Tamil	land	simply	as	a	subdivision	of	India	is	to	choose	to	ignore	this	Tamil	history	and	this	Tamil	present.		
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Appendix One: A Note on Transliteration 		Transliterating	Tamil	presents	a	particular	set	of	challenges.	The	formal	convention	in	the	Western	academy	is	to	use	the	transliteration	scheme	found	in	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon,	which	provides	a	systematic,	one-to-one	correspondence	between	written	Tamil	and	English	(i.e.,	Latin)	graphemes.	However,	while	the	precision	of	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon	is	well	suited	for	the	needs	of	specialists	acquainted	with	Tamil	orthography,	use	of	the	system	also	has	several	important	drawbacks.	The	academic	system	of	Sanskrit	transliteration	on	which	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon’s	system	is	based	has,	by	merit	of	the	phonetic	structure	of	the	Devanagari	alphabet,	a	precise	correlation	to	the	proper	pronunciation	of	any	given	Sanskrit	word.	Unlike	Devanagari	-	and	for	that	matter,	all	of	the	other	major	scripts	used	in	South	Asia	-	Tamil	script	does	not	mark	its	letters	for	voicing	(i.e.,	the	distinction	between	English	“t”	and	“d”).	While	the	correct	pronunciation	of	a	Tamil	letter	in	a	native	Tamil	word	can	be	ascertained	from	its	phonetic	environment	according	to	a	short	list	of	regular	phonetic	rules,	a	reader	without	Tamil-language	experience	often	cannot	use	the	purely	orthographic	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon	scheme	to	correctly	pronounce	a	given	word.		Native	Tamil	speakers,	on	the	other	hand,	abide	by	a	somewhat	consistent	common-sense	transliteration	scheme	that	developed	historically	out	of	interactions	between	Tamilians	and	British	colonial	administrators.	The	features	of	this	scheme	are	a	lack	of	diacritics,	general	recognition	of	voicing	distinctions	(commonly	excepting	“th”),	
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numerous	digraphs	(“th”,	“zh”,	“aa”,	etc.),	compression	of	several	phonetically	distinct	Tamil	letters	(e.g.,	த/ட, ந/ன/ண/ங/ஞ) into	single	English	equivalents	(“t”,	“n”,	etc.),	and	frequent	deference	to	Sanskrit	or	North	Indian	transliterations	or	pronunciations	(“Ramaswamy”	for	ராமசாமி)	when	transliterating	Sanskrit-derived	proper	nouns.	This	scheme	presents	the	obvious	advantage	of	already	being	in	common	use	among	Tamil	speakers,	and	thus	is	the	natural	choice	for	non-academic	works.	However,	this	scheme	cannot	offer	the	orthographic	precision	required	to	deduce	the	Tamil	spelling	of	a	given	word	from	its	transliteration.	Nor	can	it	necessarily	guarantee	complete	consistency	in	transliteration	–	observation	of	the	distinction	between	long	and	short	vowels,	for	example,	is	to	an	extent	up	to	the	discretion	of	the	individual	transliterator	(e.g.,	“Lalitha”	and	“Lalithaa”	for	ல"தா). This	scheme	is	thus	not	suitable	for	academic	transliterations,	save	in	cases	like	common	proper	names	in	which	a	certain	transliteration	has	become	standard	(e.g.	“Coimbatore”	for	ேகாய%&'()). 	In	this	work,	I	have	used	a	hybrid	system	in	which	I	use	the	diacritics	of	the	Madras	Tamil	lexicon	scheme	while	recognizing	the	voicing	distinctions	and	other	minor	phonetic	considerations	(e.g.,	the	pronunciation	of	ச as	either	“s”	or	“ch”	depending	on	the	word	and	phonetic	environment)	that	individual	Tamil	letters	do	not	distinguish.	As	a	result,	my	hybrid	system	allows	for	the	precise	reconstruction	of	a	given	Tamil	word	from	its	transliteration	while	also	giving	the	non-specialist,	non-Tamil-speaking	reader	a	rough	guide	to	accurately	pronouncing	the	word.	My	
		 50	
hybrid	system	also	to	some	extent	bridges	the	gap	between	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon	scheme	and	the	popular	Tamilian	transliteration	scheme. In	many	cases,	this	hybrid	system	is	able	to	provide	orthographically	precise	transliterations	that	differ	from	their	popular	transliterations	only	in	added	diacritical	marks	(i.e.,	
Saṅgam	for	Sangam)	or	not	at	all	(Sambandar	for	Sambandar),	versus	the	often	very	alien	transliterations	of	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon	scheme	(caṅkam,	Campantar).	Even	in	the	cases	when	my	scheme	diverges	from	the	popular	scheme	(māṅgāy	for	“maangai”,	māmbaḻam	for	“maampazham”),	my	equivalent	offers	a	reasonably	accurate	phonetic	approximation	usually	recognizable	to	a	non-specialist	Tamil	speaker. 	I	do,	however,	apologize	for	the	deeply	awkward	Dirāviḍa	that	my	system	generates	for	திராவிட (“Dravidian”),	which	languishes	in	the	uncanny	valley	between	the	Madras	Tamil	Lexicon	and	the	commonsense	Tamil	system	because	of	its	deference	to	the	Tamil	orthographic	convention	of	inserting	vowels	to	prevent	Sanskrit	loanwords	from	beginning	with	two	consecutive	consonants.	The	standard	pronunciation	of	the	word	and	its	commonsense	Tamil	transliteration	both	reflect	the	word’s	(rather	ironic)	Sanskrit	roots	in	the	Sanskrit	word	Drāviḍa.	Given	the	ultimate	goal	of	my	system	to	provide	phonetic	accuracy	and	readability	to	the	non-specialist,	I	have	transliterated	திராவிட	as	“Drāviḍa”	throughout.	
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Appendix Two: Map of the Dravidianist Associative Network 
 This	figure	depicts	the	range	of	polar	qualities	attributed	to	the	native	Tamil	and	invading	Aryan	civilizations	of	the	Dravidianist	historical	narrative.	The	labels	given	to	each	of	these	categories	describe	the	general	quality	shared	by	different	specific	Dravidianist	attributions:	therefore,	the	“indigenous,	rational	Tamil	religious	system”	is	a	Buddhist	moral-philosophical	ethic	for	Thass,	a	monotheistic	and	pure-Tamil	Saivism	for	Adigal,	a	rationalist	atheism	for	Periyar,	and	so	on.	Different	Dravidianist	projects	will	lend	different	degrees	of	emphasis	to	each	of	these	categories.	Note	that	the	final	two	categories	become	salient	later	in	Dravidianist	history,	and	so	are	not	necessarily	present	explicitly	in	earlier	Dravidianist	thought.	I	have	included	them	on	this	chart	because	of	the	outsize	importance	they	acquire	in	Dravidianist	ideology	and	symbolism	starting	in	the	1930s.
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Notes 																																																								1	See	Ramaswamy	(1997),	p.	46-62	for	an	informative	discussion	of	the	Indian	nationalist	engagement	with	the	Tamil	language	and	classical	Tamil	culture.	2	This	term	occasionally	appears	in	other	specialist	works,	but	there	is	not	a	scholarly	consensus	on	its	specific	referent.	See,	for	example,	Ramaswamy	(1997),	who	uses	the	term	to	refer	to	the	social-political	ideology	associated	with	Periyar	and	the	Self-Respect	Movement,	and	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(2011),	who	use	the	term	to	refer	to	the	basic	idea	of	ancient	Dravidian	cultural	autonomy	at	the	heart	of	Caldwell’s	narrative.	3	Tamil	“Ayōttidāsar”	4	I	have	used	the	term	“Dalit”	here	(and	throughout)	in	deference	to	the	modern	convention	for	describing	the	subaltern	caste	position	that	Thass	alternately	described	as	“Untouchable”	and	“Paraiyar”,	the	latter	reflecting	the	major	Tamil	Dalit	jāti	to	which	Thass	himself	belonged.	The	chief	move	of	Thass’s	project,	though,	was	to	rearticulate	these	subaltern	caste	identities	into	the	religious-civilizational-racial	identity	of	Ādi	Drāviḍa	(“first	Dravidian”).			5	In	deference	to	the	Tamil	spelling	and	pure-Tamil	pronunciation	of	the	word,	I	have	transliterated	this	word	as	“Saiva”	rather	than	the	Sanskrit-derived	spelling	“Śaiva”	that	is	more	common	in	religious	studies	literature.	Considering	Maraimalai	Adigal’s	fervent	advocacy	for	the	adoption	of	a	de-Sanskritized	“pure	Tamil”	(taṉittamiḻ),	which	he	understood	as	a	natural	outgrowth	of	his	religious	reform	project,	I	think	this	is	an	appropriate	deference	to	Adigal’s	sensibilities.	6	One	of	Iyothee	Thass’s	chief	lieutenants,	who	was	an	important	social	organizer	associated	with	the	Dravida	Mahajana	Sabha	7	The	co-founder	of	the	Justice	Party	whose	contributions	to	non-Brahmin	Tamil	politics	will	be	examined	in	more	detail	in	a	following	section	of	this	thesis	8	An	important	and	vocal	Justice	Party	supporter	who	became	an	endorser	of	Periyar’s	Self-Respect	Movement	9	Maraimalai	Adigal’s	daughter,	who	played	a	foundational	(but	often	unrecognized)	role	in	Adigal’s	Pure	Tamil	Movement	and	was	an	important	cultural	thinker	and	women’s	rights	activist	in	her	own	right.	“Ammaiyar”	is	an	honorific	title;	Neelambikai	has	no	familial	relation	to	Ramamritham	Ammaiyar	10	An	important	Dalit	women’s	rights	activist	who	spent	a	good	portion	of	her	career	affiliated	with	the	Self-Respect	Movement	before	losing	faith	in	the	Movement		11	An	important	Self-Respect	ideologue	who	regularly	contributed	to	Self-Respect	journals	12	A	Dravidian	nationalist	politician	and	ideologue	who	was	one	of	the	founders	of	the	Drāviḍa	Muṉṉetṟa	Kaḻagam.	13	The	face	of	the	DMK	from	the	early	1960s	up	until	his	death	in	August	2018,	who	in	addition	to	serving	multiple	terms	as	chief	minister	of	Tamil	Nadu	was	also	a	renowned	Tamil	nationalist	screenwriter	and	anti-Hindi	agitator.	14	Aṇṇa	is	the	popular	nickname	for	CN	Annadurai,	one	of	the	founding	figures	of	the	DMK.	Annadurai	himself	was	no	longer	alive	by	the	time	that	the	ADMK	broke	ranks	
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																																																																																																																																																																					with	the	DMK;	his	inclusion	in	the	ADMK’s	name	evokes	a	notion	of	the	ADMK’s	return	to	the	roots	of	Dravidian	politics.	15	Scroll.in	(Govindarajan,	14	Jan.	2018)	16	By	using	the	past	tense	here,	I	intend	to	reflect	the	fact	that	I	have	been	unable	to	locate	sources	describing	the	village	jallikaṭṭu	tradition	in	the	time	following	the	Marina	Beach	protests.	It	is	unclear	how	–	if	at	all	–	the	tradition	has	changed	as	a	result	of	its	time	in	the	Tamil	public	eye	and	the	public	criticism	the	tradition	received	from	Dalit	and	anti-caste	activists.	17	Scroll.in	(Yamunan,	19	Jan.	2017)	18	Following	Nathaniel	Roberts’s	apt	note	[2010,	p.	1	(footnote)],	I	have	used	the	transliteration	“Thirumavalavan”	(for	Tirumāvaḷavaṉ),	which	is	the	spelling	Thirumavalavan	himself	uses,	over	“Thirumaavalavan”,	which	is	the	spelling	Meena	Kandasamy	uses	for	her	translated	volumes	19	Eenadu	India	(Jan.	2017)	20	Gorringe	(2016),	p.	50	21	The	footnotes	in	Kandasamy’s	volumes	contain	a	number	of	examples	of	Thevar	violence	against	Dalits.	See	also	[https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/India994-07.htm]	for	a	more	thorough	Human	Rights	Watch	report	on	Thevar	violence	against	the	Devendra	Kula	Vellalar	(Dalit)	community.	22	See,	for	example,	the	activists	quoted	in	The	News	Minute	(Muralidharan,	25	April	2018)	for	an	example	of	the	esteem	in	which	Dalit	activists	hold	Thirumavalavan	23Gorringe	(2016)	gives	an	account	of	the	tensions	within	VCK	ranks	that	have	emerged	around	this	shift	in	the	organization’s	mission.	24	Unfortunately,	the	confines	of	this	project	will	not	allow	me	to	engage	directly	with	Dr.	Ambedkar’s	narrative	of	“Untouchable”	history,	which	is	perhaps	slightly	more	attuned	to	racial	divisions	within	South	Asia	than	many	successive	Ambedkarite	movements	are.	The	most	notable	example	of	this	in	Ambedkar’s	thought	is	his	contention	that	Dravidian	peoples	were	the	inhabitants	of	India	prior	to	Aryan	invasion.	Per	Aloysius	(1996,	p.	187),	Ambedkar	was	in	contact	with	the	Tamil	Buddhist	communities	associated	with	Iyothee	Thass’s	Dravida	Mahajana	Sabha,	and	so	it	certainly	seems	feasible	to	assume	some	sort	of	dialogue	between	Ambedkar	and	Thass’s	supporters	on	the	topic.	However,	it	is	also	possible	that	Ambedkar	arrived	at	this	idea	independently	through	his	consumption	of	some	of	the	same	colonial-era	histories	that	influenced	Thass’s	formulation	of	Ādi	Drāviḍa	history.	25	To	a	certain	extent,	Ambedkar	and	subsequent	Ambedkarite	activists	and	thinkers	have	sought	to	establish	an	identity	for	the	Dalit	community	independent	of	their	position	in	caste	hierarchy.	The	above	note	references	Ambedkar’s	project	of	writing	Dalit	civilizational	history,	which	is	one	of	the	most	common	ways	by	which	Dalit	thinkers	and	activists	have	sought	to	generate	such	an	identity.	Nevertheless,	these	projects	never	seek	to	obscure	the	social	oppression	that	the	current	Dalit	community	faces	or	to	supplant	that	oppression	as	the	justification	for	Dalit	political	unity.	26	Thirumaavalavan,	2003	and	2004	
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																																																																																																																																																																					27	Uproot	Hindutva,	151	(“Only	Caste-Annihilating	Tamil	Nationalism”)	28	Uproot	Hindutva,	131	(“We	Will	Worship	Tamil!		We	Will	Worship	Through	Tamil!”)	29	Uproot	Hindutva,	180	(“Bhakti	Literature”)	30	This	is	a	common	term	for	Dalit-caste	ghettoes	in	both	English	and	Tamil	(pronounced	“kāḷani”)	that	does	not	denote	a	connection	to	British	colonialism.	31	cf.,	e.g.,	Uproot	Hindutva	83	(“Eelam	Means	Tigers!”),	where	Thirumavalavan	cites	the	word	sōṟu	for	“cooked	rice”	(versus	the	Sanskrit-derived	sādam)	and	122	(“We	Will	Worship	Tamil!	We	Will	Worship	Through	Tamil!”),	where	he	cites	the	word	
kamukkam	for	“secret”	(versus	the	Sanskrit-derived	ragasiyam)	32	Uproot	Hindutva	154	(“Only	Caste-Annihilating	Tamil	Nationalism”)	33	cite	34	This	becomes	particularly	evident	in	Thirumavalavan’s	use	of	terms	like	kuppam	(“slum”,	“fisherman	village”)	that	Thirumavalavan	uses	as	synonyms	of	chēri	[cf.	
Uproot	Hindutva,	83]		35	See	the	brief	but	illuminating	discussion	in	Geetha	and	Rajadurai	(105-109),	which	summarizes	the	work	of	several	important	missionary	figures	preceding	Caldwell.	36	Cf.	Periyar’s	essay	Ātma,	Mōṭcham-Naragam	(“Ātmā,	the	Hell	of	Mokṣa”,	Chennai:	
Periyār	Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam,	2007),	which	frames	its	argument	through	this	linguistic	reading.	This	is	a	rhetorical	move	Periyar	makes	with	other	Hindu	theological	terms	(e.g.,	karma,	dharma,	varṇa)	in	a	number	of	other	speeches	and	essays.	37	I	use	“activist”	in	the	sense	that	all	Dravidianist	movements	were	principally	occupied	with	effecting	social	or	cultural	change	and	created	social	organizations	to	further	this	change.	My	use	of	“activist”	in	this	sense	does	not	necessarily	imply	the	politicization	of	these	agendas	or	intend	to	speak	on	the	actual	social	impact	of	Dravidianist	activist	projects.	38	Commonly	referred	to	in	scholarly	literature	as	“U.V.	Swaminatha	Iyer”	in	reflection	of	his	Brahmin	caste	identity.	Given	that	he	is	readily	recognizable	in	the	Tamil	country	without	the	use	of	his	caste	name,	I	have	opted	to	exclude	it.	This	also	seems	appropriate	since	he	did	not	strongly	affiliate	himself	with	the	dominant	Brahmin	cultural	position	of	his	time,	which	sought	to	emphasize	an	Aryan	racial-civilizational	history	to	the	exclusion	of	the	Dravidian	Tamil	tradition.	39	Aloysius	(p.	47)	40	See	Pandian	(2007;	p.	117-119)	for	a	more	thorough	discussion	of	this	point		41	While	the	elevated	position	of	the	Vellalar	community	in	Tamil	history	is	common	knowledge	in	Tamil	studies,	Aloysius	(p.	39)	provides	an	interesting	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	the	Vellalar	and	Brahmin	communities	in	premodern	Tamil	caste	dynamics.	42	Vaithees	(2016;	p.	65)	43	See	especially	Vaithees	(2016;	p.	69-99)	44	Hellman-Rajanayagam	(p.	123-124)	45	Indeed,	a	fair	number	of	Tamil-language	studies	on	the	emergence	of	Dravidianist	ideology	have	somewhat	credibly	understood	it	to	have	begun	as	a	Vellalar-caste	
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																																																																																																																																																																					movement.	See	Pandian	(1994;	p.	84)	and	Venkatachalapathy	(1995;	p.	761),	who	both	cite	this	consensus.	46	A	major	ecological	reserve	in	Kerala	is	also	named	after	Periyar	in	recognition	of	his	advocacy	at	Vaikom.	47	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	344-351)	48	Vijaya	Ramaswamy	(p.	69)	covers	the	falling	out	between	Periyar	and	Moovalur	Ramamritham	Ammaiyar,	an	important	Dalit	women’s	rights	activist,	that	resulted	in	part	from	Periyar’s	refusal	to	endorse	the	bill.	49	cf.	Pandian	(2007;	p.	19-26)	50	Chennai’s	Marina	Beach	–	the	same	important	local	landmark	where	the	jallikaṭṭu	protests	were	centered	–	has	a	statue	honoring	Pope	for	his	contributions	to	the	study	of	Tamil.	51	See,	for	example,	Pope’s	preface	to	his	translation	of	the	Tiruvāsagam	(The	
Tiruvaçagam;	or,	Sacred	Utterances	of	the	Tamil	Poet,	Saint,	and	Sage	Manikka-
Vaçagar;	Oxford,	1900)	52	Vaithees	(2016;	p.	187)	53	The	Periyar	Memorial	complex	in	Vepery,	Chennai,	which	is	the	present-day	home	of	the	still-functioning	Drāviḍar	Kaḻagam,	prominently	displays	this	connection	on	memorial	plaques,	as	well	as	in	the	titles	of	a	number	of	materials	shelved	in	its	Periyar	Book	House.	As	of	2018,	a	Tamil	translation	of	Russell’s	“Why	I	Am	Not	a	Christian”	was	available	for	purchase	in	the	Book	House.	54	Vaithees,	(2016;	p.	139-143)	55	For	example,	Max	Müller	(Vaithees,	2016;	p.	99).	Adigal	also	called	William	James	“a	spiritual	teacher	of	mine”	(Vaithees;	2016,	p.	141)	56	see	especially	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	77-86)	57	again,	see	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	77-86),	although	Aloysius	makes	note	that	the	social	conditions	of	late	Vijayanagara	rule	had	given	a	high	degree	of	economic	and	social	prosperity	to	Tamil	Dalit	communities	that	was	undone	by	colonial	social	and	economic	policy	(p.	33-34,	37-39)	58	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	51-54)		59	This	partly	reflects	the	early	part	of	Periyar’s	activist	career	as	a	member	of	the	Indian	National	Congress,	and	certainly	also	reflects	the	run-ins	Periyar	and	the	Self-Respect	Movement	had	with	colonial	power	resulting	from	his	adoption	of	a	leftist	economic	platform	in	the	early	1930s.	Several	Self-Respect	journals	were	shut	down	by	colonial	authorities,	and	both	Periyar	and	his	brother	were	briefly	imprisoned	at	different	periods	for	their	involvement	with	Self-Respect	leftism.	60	For	instance,	Brahmins	filled	83.3%	of	sub-judge	positions	and	72.6%	of	district	
munsif	positions	in	the	Presidency	(Irschick,	p.	14).	See	also	Pandian	(2007;	p.	68-69)	61	See	especially	Pandian	(2007;	p.	77-84)	62	To	use	“society”	in	the	singular	here	is	to	assert	a	national	social	unity	that	was	not	present	in	pre-colonial	India.	63	cf.	Dirks	(2001;	chapters	4-6)	for	a	comprehensive	discussion	on	this	topic	64	Pandian	(2007;	p.	72-77)	offers	a	brilliant	discussion	of	the	linkage	of	Brahmin	material	and	cultural	power	in	colonial	Madras	Presidency	
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																																																																																																																																																																					65	Seen	principally	in	the	emergence	of	a	Utilitarian,	statistical	philosophy	of	governance	in	British	colonial	territories.	Bernard	Cohn	and	Arjun	Appadurai	have	been	the	chief	scholars	to	historicize	and	theorize	this	concept.	66	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	76)	67	I	intend	my	argument	here	to	speak	in	part	to	off-hand	Indian	nationalist	readings	of	Dravidianism	as	European	assimilationism.	Such	readings	reflect	a	fundamental	–	and	perhaps	willful	–	ignorance	of	Dravidianist	movements	and	their	social	context.	68	Thass’s	push	to	rehabilitate	Brahminical	ritual	as	a	feature	of	Ādi	Drāviḍa	Buddhism	relies	on	his	contention	that	Brahmins	stole	these	rituals	from	the	ancient	Dravidian	Buddhist	community.	69	Venkatachalapathy	(1995;	p.	762-763)	70	An	example	of	a	less	directly	material	policy	focus	of	the	Justice	Party	government	was	its	introduction	of	the	Hindu	Religious	Endowments	Act,	which	put	the	finances	of	Hindu	temples	in	the	Presidency	under	the	direct	supervision	of	the	Madras	Presidency	government.	This	move	was	made	to	counter	what	Justice	Party	members	understood	as	Brahmin	exploitation	and	defalcation	in	the	religious	realm.	Cf.	Geetha	&	Rajadurai	(p.	200-207)	for	an	illuminating	discussion	on	this	topic.	71	Aloysius	(p.	49)	72	Arooran	(p.	39-40)	73	Arooran,	42	74	cf.	Arooran	(p.	70-122),	who	describes	this	campaign	in	detail.	75	The	British	colonial	administration’s	deference	to	Brahminical	textual	norms	has	been	amply	established	in	contemporary	scholarship	on	caste	and	colonial	administration	(see,	for	example,	Dirks	[2001]),	and	so	I	will	simply	gesture	to	it	here	rather	than	engaging	in	a	more	detailed	discussion	on	the	point.	76	See	for	example,	T.N.	Sivagnanam	Pillai’s	statement	in	Arooran	(p.	90)	77	See,	for	example,	Kandasamy	Chetty’s	invocation	of	terms	like	“social	justice”	and	“democracy”	at	the	First	Adi	Dravida	Conference	(Geetha	&	Rajadurai;	p.	189-191)	78	See,	for	example,	Harriss	(2002),	Pinto	(year),	and	Pandian	(year).	79	See	Pandian	(1991)	for	a	breakdown	of	Parasakti	as	DMK	propaganda	and	the	response	the	film	garnered	from	forces	opposed	to	the	DMK’s	platform.					
 
 
 	
